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Judicial Power & Civil Rights Reconsidered
David E. Bernstein and Ilya Somin

Abstract

Michael Klarman’s “From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality” is an important contribution to the scholarly literature on both the history of the civil rights struggle and judicial power more generally. Klarman argues that for much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
was very reluctant to rule in favor of African American civil rights claimants, and
had little impact when it did.
Klarman is right to reject traditional accounts that greatly exaggerated the Supreme
Court’s willingness and ability to protect minorities. However, he overstates his
case. The Court’s views on the proper scope of African Americans’ rights periodically diverged from that of the political branches of government. The Justices’
relative insulation from political pressure; their membership in a different generational cohort than the median voter; the idiosyncrasies of presidential selection of
Justices; and the Justices’ nationalist inclinations all help explain this result.
Moreover, in at least three types of situations, judicial invalidation of Jim Crow
legislation significantly aided African Americans: (1) when such legislation had
solved collective action problems among racist whites; (2) when legislation had
enabled white actors to externalize the costs of Jim Crow onto society as a whole;
and (3) when laws lowered the overall costs of maintaining Jim Crow.
This Review supports these conclusions by closely examining relevant Supreme
Court decisions, especially Progressive Era cases and Brown v. Board of Education.
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Racial Equality. By Michael J. Klarman. New York: Oxford University
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INTRODUCTION
No line of cases enhanced the prestige of the Supreme Court as much
as Brown v. Board of Education1 and other decisions vindicating the rights
of African Americans. Initially, Brown was criticized by some prominent
liberal legal scholars for overruling the democratic process in a way
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

101

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF

11/5/2004 3:32 PM

102

[Vol. nn:nnn

The Yale Law Journal

reminiscent of hated Lochner-era jurisprudence.2 Later, once a liberal
consensus favoring Brown coalesced, and Brown came to be seen by
liberals as a courageous, important, and correct decision on behalf of civil
rights, the anti-Brown banner was raised, if at all, only by some
conservatives opposed to what they perceived as the Court’s illegitimate
judicial activism.3
In recent years, however, liberal adulation of Brown has come under
severe criticism from revisionist scholars associated with the political left.
This time, the charge is not that Brown was wrongly decided or otherwise
improper as a matter of constitutional law. Rather, Brown revisionists argue
that both scholars and the popular media have vastly exaggerated the
importance of Brown to the African-American freedom struggle. Moreover,
the revisionists suggest that Brown, by focusing the energies of liberal
advocates of social change on what the revisionists see as largely
unproductive litigation, has actually retarded the progressive agenda.4
Michael J. Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is an impressive
addition to the revisionist literature.5 Klarman pays close attention to the
social and political context of civil rights litigation and makes a powerful
2. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 564
(1988) (explaining that for many 1950s liberal academics, “opposition to Lochner demanded
opposition to Brown as a matter of integrity and principle”). Prominent liberal critiques of Brown
included LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). The Court was not completely
oblivious to such criticism and sometimes explicitly distinguished its decisions in race cases from
Lochner. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“We agree, of
course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’” (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905))).
The articles critical of Brown generated a pro-Brown backlash. See, e.g., Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Owen M. Fiss,
Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564
(1965); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1959).
3. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE
(1995). Perhaps the lone liberal holdout on Brown was quirky originalist Raoul Berger. See
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977) (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided because it was contrary to the
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) (alleging that Brown failed to improve
education for African Americans and suggesting that the Court might have done better to enforce
the pre-Brown “separate but equal” regime more rigorously); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION (2004) (asserting that Brown failed to effectively promote integration); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9-169 (1991)
(arguing that Brown did nothing to advance civil rights and may even have retarded progress by
stimulating a Southern white backlash and by diverting black activists away from political action
that would have been more effective than litigation).
5. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
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argument that defenders of the Supreme Court vastly overstate both its
inclination and its ability to protect the rights of politically weak racial
minorities.6 From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is the definitive study of the
Supreme Court’s role in the civil rights struggles of the twentieth century. It
is also a major contribution to the broader debate over the efficacy of
judicial power as a tool for protecting oppressed minority groups.
Reviews of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights have focused primarily on
Klarman’s discussion of Brown.7 Like other revisionist writings,8
Klarman’s initial works on race and the Supreme Court principally focused
on the limitations of Brown and its immediate progeny as vehicles for
desegregating schools.9 But while Klarman provides a detailed and thoughtprovoking history of Brown and its impact, most of the book is devoted to
events and cases that predated Brown and had no direct connection to
school desegregation. This Review focuses primarily on this broader history
(especially with regard to the Progressive Era), in part to redress the
unbalanced treatment of Klarman’s book found in most other reviews, and
in part because of the expertise of the authors, but mostly because Brown
has peculiar features that make it an unfair exemplar of Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding minority rights. In particular, it seems inappropriate
to judge the efficacy of judicial review by the one Supreme Court opinion
of the twentieth century to attract massive resistance from an entire region
of the United States.
This Review provides a balanced appreciation of Klarman’s
impressively multifaceted analysis. Without losing sight of the many
important insights and historical details that Klarman provides, the Review
focuses on some of the weaknesses in his argument. While Klarman is right
to reject the view that courts could, by themselves, eliminate Jim Crow and
other forms of oppression, he underestimates both the willingness and the
ability of courts to make a difference. Klarman properly emphasizes the
limits of law as a tool for protecting oppressed minorities, and his work,
like that of other revisionists,10 serves as a useful corrective to that of
6. Klarman’s critique of judicial power in the present work was prefigured in several articles.
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L.
REV. 7 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Change]; Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So
Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145 (1998).
7. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, “Happy” Birthday Brown v. Board of Education? Brown’s
Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REV. 693
(2004) (review of Klarman’s book focused primarily on Brown); Randall Kennedy, Schoolings in
Equality: What Brown Did and Did Not Accomplish, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5 & 12, 2004, at 29
(same); Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102 (same).
8. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 4; ROSENBERG, supra note 4.
9. Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 6; Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race
Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
10. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
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formerly dominant judicial triumphalists who have overstated the power of
litigation as a tool for social change. Yet Klarman, while more modest in
his conclusions than some of his revisionist predecessors, at times
underestimates the importance of Supreme Court decisions and of law more
generally. An accurate understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in
aiding or preventing the oppression of minorities—which is important both
to understand our past and to escape future errors—requires avoiding both
undue hagiography and undue skepticism.
Part I of this Review summarizes Klarman’s analysis of the
development of Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence in the Jim Crow
era. Although Klarman covers a wide range of cases and issues, there is a
common theme of skepticism about the importance of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence both in contributing to the oppression of African Americans
and in reducing that oppression.11
Judges’ ability to affect the condition of African Americans was,
Klarman argues, severely limited by two major constraints. First, judges
“rarely hold views that deviate far from dominant public opinion.”12 They
are therefore “unlikely to have the inclination . . . to defend minority rights
from majoritarian invasion.”13 Second, even in the rare cases where judges
are inclined to protect oppressed minorities, they generally will be unable to
do so because deeply rooted oppression, such as that imposed on African
Americans in the Jim Crow era, “depended more on social custom and
physical force than on law.”14 In Klarman’s view,
Most Jim Crow laws merely described white supremacy;
they did not produce it. Legal disfranchisement measures
and de jure railroad segregation played relatively minor
roles in disfranchising and segregating southern blacks.
Entrenched social mores, reinforced by economic power
and the threat and reality of physical violence, were
primarily responsible for bolstering the South’s racial
hierarchy. Legal instantiation of these norms was often
more symbolic than functional. Thus, more favorable Court

11. Klarman’s refusal to credit or blame the Court for the ups and downs of blacks’ status
was reflected in the original working title of Klarman’s book, Neither Hero Nor Villain: The
Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
NEITHER HERO NOR VILLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY—CHAPTER 1: THE PLESSY ERA (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 99-3a, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=169262.
12. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7.
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rulings, even if enforceable, would not have alleviated the
oppression of southern blacks.15
This two-pronged attack on the importance of judicial power pervades
Klarman’s analysis of a wide range of issues, though he is careful to note
that some decisions had an impact at the margin.16 Klarman, like Gerald
Rosenberg,17 attributes the eventual improvement in the legal, social, and
political position of African Americans after World War II primarily to
broad social forces rather than to changes in the law.18
Part II provides a theoretical framework outlining important
qualifications to Klarman’s view that judicial power had little impact on
Jim Crow because the judiciary was usually both unwilling and unable to
have a major effect. Economists and political scientists have devoted only
limited attention to understanding the mechanisms and effects of publicsector discrimination,19 but more general economic literature suggests that
attempts by Southern whites to establish inflexible and unyielding
discriminatory norms necessarily ran into problems. Particularly important
was the problem of collective action.20 Jim Crow laws that sanctioned white
defectors were often necessary to prevent collective action problems from
unraveling the system of white supremacy.21 These laws also helped to
establish and maintain white supremacy through cost externalization. As we
shall see, many Jim Crow laws fulfilled the function of externalizing costs
from individual whites and white-owned businesses onto society as a
whole, including both African-American and white taxpayers.22 These laws
also often served the purpose of cost minimization—ensuring that white
15. Id. at 59-60.
16. See, e.g., id. at 7; see also infra Part IV (discussing Brown).
17. ROSENBERG, supra note 4. For the classic article arguing that courts have little power to
resist public opinion and broad social trends, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
18. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 4-5, 443-46. Klarman does not, however, go as far
in this direction as Rosenberg. See Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 6, at 10 & n.9 (partially
rejecting Rosenberg’s thesis with respect to Brown); see also infra Part IV.
19. See Robert A. Margo, Segregated Schools and the Mobility Hypothesis: A Model of Local
Government Discrimination, 106 Q.J. ECON. 61, 62 (1991) (“Economists have devoted
considerable attention to modeling discrimination by private agents, but have been less interested
in the formal analysis of discrimination in the public sector.”).
20. For well-known general analyses of collective action theory, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS (1980); and MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
21. See generally Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 153,
155-56 (1994) (arguing that racist Southern whites in the Jim Crow era could be analogized to a
cartel, with the cartel subject to the same pressures that make standard economic cartels so
difficult to enforce without supportive state action).
22. The cost externalization point is raised in Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the
Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63 (1984).
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supremacy was enforced at the lowest possible cost to white society. In
these situations, judicial decisions invalidating Jim Crow could and often
did have a substantial impact.
Part II argues that Klarman’s otherwise commendable focus on broader
social forces as the main cause of the eventual collapse of Jim Crow ignores
ways in which those broader developments were in part dependent on a
favorable legal environment. Part II also suggests that Klarman
underestimates the degree to which judges are sometimes willing and able
to reach decisions that run counter to majoritarian views.
Part III addresses the Court’s Progressive Era decisions protecting
African-American civil rights. This period poses a challenge to Klarman’s
theory that Supreme Court decisions usually reflect the political and social
climate of the times. Although the Progressive Era marked the worst period
of post-Civil War American racism,23 it nonetheless witnessed a series of
important decisions protecting the rights of southern blacks in four areas of
law: defending African-American voting rights against so-called
“grandfather clauses,” stating that Jim Crow laws must guarantee blacks
equivalent railroad accommodations as were provided to whites,
invalidating debt peonage laws intended to restrict the mobility of black
labor, and invalidating housing segregation laws.
Part IV of this Review considers Klarman’s insightful discussion of
Brown v. Board of Education and its impact. Klarman contends that Brown
did not, in and of itself, substantially reduce school segregation in the
South;24 he claims, however, that the extreme and violent “massive
resistance” of Southern whites to the Supreme Court’s decision
strengthened Northern white commitment to civil rights and eventually led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unlike Brown, the Act led to
the relatively rapid demise of school segregation throughout the South.25
Klarman’s analysis, like that of other Brown skeptics, underestimates
the impact of Brown on Southern public schools. It largely ignores changes
in education policy, including major funding increases for AfricanAmerican schools, brought on by the mere threat of a school desegregation
court decision.26 Furthermore, Klarman’s claim that Brown had, and could
have had, little effect other than through the Northern response to the
massive resistance of Southern whites raises an important question: Why
did segregationists massively resist a court decision that was unlikely to
have any real effect on their cherished institutions? A definitive answer to
this question requires additional research. However, this Review tentatively
23.
24.
25.
26.

KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 63.
Id. at 344-60.
Id. at 360-63.
See infra Section IV.A.
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suggests that Brown might not have been as toothless as Klarman and other
revisionist scholars suggest.
I. SUMMARY OF KLARMAN’S THESIS
This Part briefly summarizes the wide-ranging analysis of From Jim
Crow to Civil Rights. The book is divided chronologically into five parts,
covering the Plessy era,27 the Progressive Era,28 the interwar period,29
World War II,30 and finally Brown and its impact.31 For convenience, this
Part follows the same format.
A. The Plessy Era
The main theme of Klarman’s account of the Plessy era, roughly 1890
to 1910, is that Plessy and other pro-segregation decisions were an
inevitable byproduct of social and political developments that undermined
Northern white support for African-American civil rights and strengthened
Southern white opposition to racial change.32 Klarman also argues that Jim
Crow laws were not necessary to ensure the perpetuation of segregation and
white supremacy, because a combination of social mores, private violence,
and informal administrative discretion used against African Americans by
low-level officials was more than sufficient to achieve the goals of white
racists.33 The claim that Plessy did not mark a true watershed is not entirely
original to Klarman.34 But he does give this argument its most
thoroughgoing exposition and defense, applying it to a wide range of areas
of civil rights law, including segregation in various settings, voting rights,
jury service, and education.35
B. The Progressive Era
The Progressive Era cases decided during the 1910s seem to undermine
Klarman’s thesis. As he notes, the period marked the “nadir” of post-Civil
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

KLARMAN, supra note 5, at ch. 1.
Id. ch. 2.
Id. ch. 3.
Id. chs. 4-5.
Id. chs. 6-7.
See id. at 58-59.
See id. at 59-60.
See, e.g., CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION (1987) (concluding that Plessy was a natural outgrowth of prior precedent and
of the political climate of the time).
35. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 48-52 (segregation); id. at 52-55 (voting rights); id. at 55-57
(jury service); id. at 57-58 (education).
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War racism in America.36 Yet African Americans won four major sets of
cases in the Supreme Court between 1911 and 1917: Bailey v. Alabama37
and United States v. Reynolds38 invalidated peonage laws “that coerced
primarily black labor”;39 dicta in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co.40 stated that railroads acting under color of state segregation
laws must ensure that black passengers have access to the same classes of
accommodations as white passengers, even if black demand for a certain
class of accommodation was too low to justify providing it from a railroad’s
economic perspective; Guinn v. United States41 and Myers v. Anderson42
held that “grandfather clauses” that implicitly discriminated against
potential black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment; and Buchanan v.
Warley43 held that a residential segregation ordinance unconstitutionally
deprived both whites and African Americans of property rights without due
process of law.
Klarman claims that the peonage and grandfather clause cases were
easy decisions because the laws flagrantly violated the Constitution in ways
that even the racist public opinion of the 1910s found reprehensible.44
Furthermore, Klarman contends that the conflict with his thesis is largely
dissipated if we recognize that the pro-civil rights Supreme Court decisions
of the Progressive Era failed to “produce significant changes in racial
practices.”45 In Part III, we dispute this interpretation, arguing that the
peonage cases and Buchanan had important positive ramifications for black
welfare.
C. The Interwar Period
The interwar years, Klarman notes, were a period of gradual
improvement in the status of African Americans. Racial change was driven
by gradual increases in black wealth and education levels, the “Great
Migration” of African Americans to the more tolerant North and West, and
a partial liberalization of white racial attitudes.46 The Supreme Court
decisions on race during this period were a “mixed bag,” including both

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 63.
219 U.S. 219 (1911).
235 U.S. 133 (1914).
KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 61.
235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
238 U.S. 347 (1915).
238 U.S. 368 (1915).
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 69-76.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 100-15.
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victories and defeats for African Americans.47 Klarman concludes that
overall, the interwar decisions made only “limited” advances in civil rights
law, and claims that the Court’s sympathy for civil rights “advanced at
roughly the same pace as the rest of the nation.”48 Moreover, he argues that
even those decisions in which African Americans prevailed had little effect
because they did not address private-sector discrimination and were often
easily circumvented.49
D. The World War II Era
Klarman views World War II as “a watershed event in the history of
American race relations.”50 During this period the social trends that aided
blacks in the interwar period—rising black economic status, migration to
the North, and liberalization in white attitudes—rapidly accelerated.51
Moreover, the struggle against Nazi racism abroad helped discredit
antiblack racism at home.52 Blacks who had served in the military or
improved their economic status by working in wartime industries were
emboldened to combat violations of their rights, contributing to a vast
expansion in African-American legal and political activism.53 After the war,
the impact of the antifascist struggle was augmented by that of the Cold
War, which led influential white elites to view racial oppression as a
hindrance to America’s efforts to win international support for the struggle
against communism, especially among emerging Third World nations.54
This period also saw a series of Supreme Court decisions significantly
expanding protections for black civil rights in the South and border states.
In Smith v. Allwright, the Court overruled a recent precedent and
invalidated white primaries.55 Klarman grants this decision a greater impact
than he is willing to concede to virtually any other covered in the book. He
points out that black voter registration in the South increased from just three
percent of all adults in 1940 to twenty percent in 1952, and concludes that
Smith “was critical to this dramatic increase in the voting registration of
southern blacks.”56 Klarman attributes this impressive effect to the threat of
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 99, 98-99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 152-62.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174-77.
Id. at 175-80.
Id. at 182-84. For a more detailed analysis, see MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); and Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
55. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
56. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 236-37.
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federal criminal prosecution of recalcitrant Southern election officials and a
newfound willingness of lower court judges to vigorously enforce and even
extend Supreme Court voting rights decisions.57 The growing political
influence of blacks in both the North and the South and slowly declining
Southern white opposition to black voting also contributed to Smith’s
impact.58
This era saw other key Supreme Court victories for African-American
rights. Klarman grants that some of these cases also had significant effects,
though not as great as those of Smith. He concludes that the invalidation of
the exclusion of blacks from state graduate schools in Sipuel v. Board of
Regents,59 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,60 and Sweatt v. Painter61
was “instrumental to desegregating higher education in the border states
and the peripheral South.”62 Similarly, he finds that a series of decisions
invalidating segregation in interstate railroads and buses had a meaningful
impact on the ground.63 On the other hand, he argues that the rejection of
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v.
Kraemer,64 and a series of criminal procedure cases expanding the
protection of black defendants and potential jurors against discrimination,
had little or no effect.65
Nonetheless, Klarman’s treatment of the World War II era is notable
for his willingness to concede that several decisions of this era had a
substantial impact independent of, or at least in addition to, progress
generated by social and political developments. As we shall see, some of
the claims that he makes on behalf of Smith and other cases of this period
may also be applicable to other decisions that he denies had any impact.
E. Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath
As already noted, Klarman’s main argument in his lengthy discussion
of Brown is that the case had little “direct” impact on school desegregation
but did have a major indirect effect by promoting a massive and often
violent Southern white backlash that repulsed Northerners and eventually
led them to support vigorous federal civil rights legislation. Klarman also
concedes that Brown helped to mobilize black political activity on behalf of

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 237, 244-46.
Id. at 180-81, 237-44.
332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam).
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 253.
Id. at 217-25, 264-65.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 225-32, 262-64, 267-86.
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civil rights.66 Ultimately, however, he concludes that any such effect was
fairly small and that the rise in black activism in the late 1950s and early
1960s was primarily caused by “[d]eep background forces” such as rising
black expectations, the example of the decolonization of Africa, and the
increasing education and political awareness of Southern blacks.67 Like
Gerald Rosenberg before him,68 Klarman even argues that Brown may have
actually “discouraged direct-action protest,” at least in the “short term,”
because it raised false hopes that civil rights goals could be achieved
through litigation alone.69
II. WHY JUDICIAL POWER MATTERS: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS
This Part examines several key theoretical reasons to expect that
judicial decisions might have an important impact on the rights of
oppressed minorities, even in a political environment in which most of the
majority group supports, or is at best indifferent to, oppressive policies.
Although Klarman is commendably thorough in his analysis of the
historical record, he makes little effort to consider relevant theoretical
literature from economics and political science. This relative neglect of
theory leads Klarman to underestimate the extent to which the enforcement
of Jim Crow laws was necessary to sustain white racial domination of
blacks, even in a period when white opinion was overwhelmingly racist.
The first three Sections present three tasks that laws performed in the
maintenance of Jim Crow: solving collective action problems among racist
whites, externalizing the costs of segregation and oppression, and
minimizing the costs of maintaining a system of white supremacy.
An additional omission from Klarman’s analysis is his failure to
consider the possibility that some of the broader social forces to which he
attributes the ultimate collapse of Jim Crow were in fact partially dependent
on a favorable legal environment. Moreover, Klarman does not sufficiently
explore why judges might be expected to go against dominant public
opinion or at least to reach decisions protecting black rights that would not
have been undertaken by politicians. These considerations are addressed in
the final two Sections of this Part.

66. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 368-81.
67. Id. at 377, 376-77.
68. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 146-50 (arguing that Brown strengthened the NAACP’s
commitment to a litigation strategy and exacerbated rivalries between the NAACP and black
organizations more oriented toward protest).
69. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 377.
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A. Jim Crow and the Logic of Collective Action
1. Collective Action as an Obstacle to White Cooperation in
Suppressing Blacks
A collective action problem arises if a group of individuals is seeking to
produce a “public good”—a benefit for the group that, if produced, will be
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.70 That is, one group member’s
consumption of the good does not interfere with that of others, and it is
impossible to exclude any group members from enjoying the benefits of the
good once it has been produced. In such a situation, group members will
have an incentive to free-ride on the production of the good so long as the
failure of any one member to contribute her share will not by itself prevent
the good from being produced.71 A collective problem is exacerbated if
group members who free-ride not only save the direct costs of contribution
but can actually reap substantial additional private benefits by defecting.
For example, a firm that defects from a price-fixing cartel might reap
disproportionately large profits as long as other cartel members continue to
adhere to the cartel’s rules.
The enforcement of Jim Crow segregation and white supremacy
provided public goods for whites who desired these things. If blacks were
barred from desirable economic opportunities, prevented from competing
with whites, and disfranchised, even those whites who had not made any
contribution to the achievement of these goals could potentially reap the
perceived benefits of maintaining racial dominance. In most circumstances,
an individual white’s failure to contribute was unlikely to make a
significant difference with respect to the outcome. This created an incentive
for individual whites to free-ride on the efforts of others to maintain Jim
Crow segregation and thus a motive for whites to seek legislation to enforce
Jim Crow norms. As Robert Cooter has noted, “[D]iscriminatory social
groups suffer the same problems of instability as any other cartel. To
sustain discriminatory norms, evaders must be punished by a combination
of informal sanctions and formal laws.”72
Cooter’s point is that collective action theory applies not only to
traditional economic price-fixing cartels, but to any situation where a group
attempts to achieve a goal that individual members have an incentive to
undercut through actions that benefit them personally at the expense of the

70. For the general theory of public goods, see BUCHANAN, supra note 20. See also Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) (giving
an early presentation of the theory).
71. OLSON, supra note 20, at 9-16.
72. Cooter, supra note 21, at 156.
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common purpose. Moreover, collective action problems do not occur only
among “selfish” individuals actuated solely by narrow self-interest.73 In a
situation where his or her cooperation or lack thereof will not by itself
affect the outcome, even a highly altruistic individual might choose not to
contribute to the public good but will instead direct her efforts to helping
others in ways that will in fact make a meaningful difference.74
Jim Crow was a comprehensive social system that restricted a wide
range of interactions between blacks and whites for the purpose of
maintaining white supremacy. As we shall see, the system included
traditional economic activities such as employment relations, but went far
beyond them. It applied also to a wide range of social norms, many of
which involved collective action problems that segregationists sought to
address through legal enforcement. The cartel model applies to these
activities no less than to traditional economic cartels.
For example, even the Jim Crow ban on interracial sexual relations and
marriage involved an attempt to solve a collective action problem among
whites through a cartel mechanism. While whites as a group, according to
the racist view, had a common interest in maintaining the “purity” of their
race and ensuring that white supremacy was not undercut through racial
integration caused by intermarriage, the maintenance of the system required
individual whites to forgo potentially appealing intimate relationships and
marriages with black partners.75 For this reason, segregationists believed
that antimiscegenation laws were essential to prevent racial
“amalgamation” even in an era when the vast majority of whites held racist
views hostile to interracial relationships.76
Klarman concludes that “[w]hite supremacy depended less on law than
on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and the threat and
reality of violence. Invalidating legislation scarcely would have made a
dent in this system.”77 Rather, only federal civil rights laws could

73. The belief that collective action theory relies on the assumption that all human behavior is
selfish is a common misunderstanding among scholars critical of the model. For examples of this
misconception, see the works cited in Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12
CRITICAL REV. 413, 436 (1998).
74. Id.; see also OLSON, supra note 20, at 64-65.
75. See generally RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 44-144 (2003) (providing numerous examples of whites who sought
interracial relationships during the Jim Crow era).
76. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held in 1878 that “[t]he purity of
public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest advancement of
our cherished southern civilization,” Kinney v. Commonweath, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869
(1878), required that interracial marriage be prevented “by prohibiting and punishing such
unnatural alliances with severe penalties,” id. at 866, so as to ensure that there would be “no
evasion” of the rule by individual whites and blacks, id. at 869.
77. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 82.
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significantly help blacks.78 Yet, if one sees Jim Crow as a wide-ranging
racist cartel, formal law enforcing the cartel’s objectives was hardly
superfluous to its success.
Obviously, the best way to break up an existing local cartel—especially
one that frequently uses violence with the acquiescence of local
authorities—is through the enforcement of a vigorous federal antitrust law,
and one can see the federal civil rights laws of the 1960s as serving an
analogous function regarding the South’s white supremacist Jim Crow
cartel. But this hardly shows that the Jim Crow cartel would not have been
weaker, perhaps even far weaker, if it had received less support from the
state in helping it externalize costs and overcome collective action problems
in particular contexts.79 If the racist cartel had received additional support
from the state—for example, if legally sanctioned chattel slavery had
continued for another hundred years—it would have been far more difficult
for federal authorities to break it up later.80
2. The Cases of Labor Mobility and Housing Segregation
The history of Southern white efforts to reduce the mobility of black
laborers and force them to stay with one employer on a near-permanent
basis provides an example of how collective action problems impeded
white efforts to control blacks and how repressive laws were adopted to
prevent breakdowns in cooperation among whites. In the post-Civil War
period, Southern white planters repeatedly attempted to form cartels81 in
order to keep down the wages of the sharecroppers and agricultural laborers
who formed the vast majority of the black population82 and prevent them

78. Id.
79. The Mafia, for example, uses “economic power and the threat and reality of violence” to
enforce its norms. Id. That hardly means, however, that the Mafia would not significantly benefit
from official government endorsement and enforcement of those norms.
80. The fact that the Jim Crow cartel operated not only in the economic realm but was also an
oppressive and authoritarian social system does not rebut the view that law played an important
role in its maintenance. When citizens become sufficiently disgruntled about a policy or regime,
sometimes all it takes to catalyze dissent is a few sincere voices or a minor event that casts doubt
on the durability of the status quo. See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES:
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995). That the postbellum legal
system never countenanced an assault on black property rights and self-ownership ultimately
provided the civil rights movement with the ability to challenge the system both from within the
South and also via migration to the North.
81. See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915, at 42 (1991) (“All over the South planters
eagerly sought to act collectively to hold down wages and to enforce contracts.”); Roback, supra
note 22, at 1161.
82. See ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, 1865-1914, at 41, 63 tbl.4.1 (1977).
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from leaving abusive employers.83 However, these efforts almost always
foundered because individual white employers had strong incentives to
renege on cartel arrangements and attempt to hire away black laborers from
their competitors.84
In the late nineteenth century, Southern states enacted peonage laws
and other restrictive legislation in an attempt to enforce white control of
black laborers.85 These laws substantially reduced black labor mobility
relative to what had existed in the face of previous voluntary efforts to
enforce white collusion against blacks, efforts consistently undermined by
collective action problems.86 The evidence that the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of peonage laws reduced this limitation on black labor mobility
is discussed in Section III.B below. The collective action problem also
applied to white efforts to keep blacks out of white neighborhoods. White
support for keeping blacks out of white neighborhoods was very strong in
the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, individual whites often had an
incentive to defect from the numerous formal and informal voluntary
arrangements set up to exclude blacks. Individual white property owners
had an interest in getting the highest possible price when selling property.
Such incentives were accentuated in situations where white property
owners feared that other whites in the neighborhood were also about to sell
to blacks or indeed had already done so; if whites were unwilling to sell to
blacks earlier, they might end up doing so later after prices in the area had
fallen as a result of a black influx.87
In the area of housing policy, local governments adopted residential
segregation statutes intended to externalize the costs of enforcing
neighborhood boundaries and solve the collective action problems white
property owners experienced when trying to prevent blacks from moving
83. STEPHEN J. DECANIO, AGRICULTURE IN THE POSTBELLUM SOUTH: THE ECONOMICS OF
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 38-40 (1974); HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-49.
84. COHEN, supra note 81, at 42 (“The evidence is . . . clear, however, that such efforts to
‘combine in self defense’ generally ended in failure.”); HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-49. See
generally RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO
CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 79-80 (Dewey W. Grantham, Jr. ed., Harper & Row 1964)
(1908) (discussing Atenant stealers”—planters who offered better wages and working conditions to
lure away African-American workers from neighboring planters). [LE: bring to OP]
85. COHEN, supra note 81 (reviewing the panoply of laws intended to stifle black migration,
the effects of these laws, and opposition to these laws among Southerners who sought to
encourage black out-migration); Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70 (discussing the types of laws
enacted); Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development in the American
South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 970, 979-82 (1979) (reviewing laws used to stifle black
labor mobility).
86. See Roback, supra note 22, at 1184-91.
87. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 859 (1998) (noting that when blacks started to
move into a white neighborhood, the remaining white neighbors would often panic and sell at
“fire sale” prices).
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into white neighborhoods. Section III.D shows that the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of these statutes in Buchanan v. Warley88 substantially
improved black access to housing by restoring the collective action
problems that existed in the absence of formal segregation laws.

3. Using Collective Action Theory To Help Explain Variation in the
Effectiveness of Judicial Intervention on Behalf of Blacks
Collective action theory helps explain why some judicial interventions
to protect black rights were relatively effective while others were largely
futile. In situations where the enforcement of white supremacy required
only the cooperation of white government officials, the invalidation of
specific discriminatory laws could easily be evaded by means of continued
discrimination through administrative discretion. By contrast, formal laws
were much more important to the maintenance of Jim Crow in policy areas
where maintaining the system required the cooperation of white privatesector economic actors who had pecuniary incentives to defect from Jim
Crow arrangements.89
As Klarman effectively documents in his book, a series of Supreme
Court decisions invalidating laws disfranchising blacks proved to be almost
completely ineffective in increasing black voter registration in the South.90
He tells a similar story about the Supreme Court’s even more extensive
efforts to crack down on antiblack discrimination in the criminal justice
system.91 In both sets of cases, white state officials found a variety of ways
to circumvent the Court’s decisions and continue to discriminate against
blacks.92 In the case of discrimination in voter registration, a major 1949
study by Harvard political scientist V.O. Key found that the exclusion of
blacks was often accomplished not through the application of specific laws

88. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
89. For a similar argument in the context of analyzing the impact of the Supreme Court’s
decisions protecting abortion rights, see ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 195-99 (noting that Roe v.
Wade had a major impact on the availability of abortions by freeing private abortion clinics from
restrictions imposed by state laws banning or closely regulating first-trimester abortions).
Rosenberg acknowledges that this conclusion is a departure from his generally highly skeptical
view of the effectiveness of judicial intervention. Id. at 199-201. He concludes that “the
availability of a market mechanism for implementation meant that in states where actors were
willing to perform abortions change could occur despite the opposition of key institutional actors”
to the Court’s decision. Id. at 201.
90. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 85-86, 158-59.
91. Id. at 152-58, 225-32, 267-86.
92. Id. at 457.
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but through the exercise of broad administrative discretion delegated to
local registrars.93
The registrars who disfranchised black voters and the state prosecutors,
police officers, and judges who discriminated against black criminal
defendants and potential jurors had little or no incentive to treat blacks
fairly. Indeed, they might well have been sanctioned or dismissed by their
political superiors if they chose not to discriminate. Key noted that, in most
Jim Crow-era Southern states, registrars were appointed by a centralized
election board tightly controlled by the state Democratic Party.94
Presumably, only officials willing and able to use their broad discretionary
powers to exclude blacks from the franchise were likely to be selected and
subsequently reappointed.
Thus, unlike white employers of black labor or white homeowners
seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods, white public officials
in the electoral and legal systems were not handicapped by collective action
problems in their efforts to perpetuate white supremacy. Indeed, to the
extent that these officials belonged to a hierarchical bureaucracy headed by
higher-level administrators committed to Jim Crow, they actually had
strong private interests in discrimination even in the unlikely event that they
were personally indifferent or hostile to the goals of the system. As long as
this was the case, discrimination against blacks in areas such as voting and
criminal justice was not significantly dependent on the establishment of
formal discriminatory laws that might be rendered inoperative by judicial
decisions.
Policy areas where enforcement of Jim Crow required the cooperation
of private economic actors with incentives to resist rooted in collective
action problems allowed much greater opportunities for effective judicial
intervention. Although they may well have been just as racist as were
public officials, these actors often would only cooperate with the system if
required to do so by laws supported by significant sanctions.95
Smith v. Allwright,96 the one voting rights decision to which Klarman
ascribes a high degree of effectiveness,97 further reinforces the explanatory
power of collective action theory. As Klarman perceptively emphasizes, by
the 1940s, Southern registrars who continued to flout Smith’s requirement
that blacks be allowed to vote in primaries on the same basis as whites
93. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 560-76 (1949). Key’s book
was based on interviews with politicians, activists, and state officials all over the South. Roscoe C.
Martin, Foreword to KEY, supra, at vi-vii.
94. KEY, supra note 93, at 561-63.
95. See the discussion of peonage and residential segregation laws infra Sections III.B and
III.D.
96. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
97. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 236-45.
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risked criminal prosecution by the Justice Department and suits for money
damages.98 Even though the Justice Department was far from consistent in
carrying out such threats,99 the mere possibility of personal criminal or civil
liability was enough to deter some registrars from continuing their
discriminatory practices.100
By imposing a potential private cost on registrars, the Court and the
Justice Department effectively created a collective action problem for them
similar to that facing white planters who sought to form a cartel to control
black laborers. Although the Department lacked the will or the resources to
force compliance on registrars throughout the South had they all refused to
follow Smith,101 individual registrars were hesitant to take the risk of
noncompliance because they lacked any assurance that their colleagues in
neighboring jurisdictions would do the same. And an isolated flouter of
federal authority likely faced an unusually high risk of prosecution.
B. Cost Externalization
The problem of cost externalization is related to, but nonetheless
distinct from, that of collective action. Even in a situation where efforts to
enforce white supremacy did not suffer from collective action problems
because the contributions of an individual white could have a substantial
impact in their own right, that individual might still choose not to act
because of the high cost of doing so. Jim Crow laws could alleviate this
reluctance by externalizing some or all of the costs of enforcement from
those individual whites to society as a whole.
Once again, white planters’ efforts to control black labor provide a
helpful example. Although white efforts to form a cartel under which the
planters agreed not to hire away each others’ workers were subject to
collective action problems and defection, any individual planter could
potentially avoid collective action problems by using the threat of violence
to prevent his own employees from leaving or demanding higher wages. In
fact, some did just that.102 However, resort to violence entailed considerable
costs: Either the planter would have to take the risk of attacking recalcitrant
black employees himself, or he would have to hire brutal thugs to serve as
enforcers. Moreover, even in the Plessy era, white planters were
occasionally punished for egregious acts of violence against black

98. Id. at 241, 458.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 241.
101. See id. (noting that “the [Justice] [D]epartment remained reluctant to prosecute”).
102. See, e.g., HIGGS, supra note 82, at 75-76.

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9

BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF

19nn]

Desktop Publishing Example

11/5/2004 3:32 PM

119

workers.103 In some instances, blacks were bold enough to fight back,
further increasing the risks faced by white planters.104
Peonage laws greatly reduced the costs faced by white planters seeking
to coerce black workers by shifting the costs and risks of enforcement to
law enforcement authorities paid for by the public fisc. A study by
economist Jennifer Roback concludes that “Southern planters may have
found it . . . profitable to collude to hold down black wages . . . only as long
as they could pass the enforcement costs on to state and local
governments.”105 She notes that nearly all peonage laws adopted by
Southern states included criminal penalties.106 This is significant because
criminal law is enforced entirely at public expense, whereas civil remedies
are only effective if private plaintiffs are willing to assume the cost of
litigation.
A similar story could be told about white property owners seeking to
exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. While violence could be and
sometimes was used to scare off black residents, the costs of such action
were much higher than simply leaving the job to state authorities enforcing
residential segregation laws. First, not all whites were willing to use
violence to keep out blacks, and some ethnic groups (Jews in particular)107
were disinclined sociologically to use violence to exclude blacks from their
neighborhoods. Second, violence raised the risks of a violent response. For
example, Klarman discusses the case of Dr. Ossian Sweet, who killed one
member of a Detroit mob trying to drive him from his home and wounded
another.108 Third, the use of violence carried the risk of arrest and possible
prosecution, especially in the North. Law enforcement protection of blacks
was hardly perfect and varied dramatically depending on the circumstances,
but it was not nonexistent, either. Even in the South, some influential
whites—real estate interests, white business elites concerned with the image
of their cities, and whites who generally opposed lawlessness of any form—

103. See 9 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at
841-56 (1984) (describing Justice Department prosecutions during the Roosevelt and Taft
Administrations); see also William F. Holmes, Whitecapping: Agrarian Violence in Mississippi,
1902-1906, 35 J.S. HIST. 165 (1969) (explaining that some Southern courts convicted whites who
used violence to drive blacks from their homes).
104. HIGGS, supra note 82, at 76.
105. Roback, supra note 22, at 1163.
106. Id. at 1166.
107. See, e.g., JONATHAN KAUFMAN, BROKEN ALLIANCE: THE TURBULENT TIMES
BETWEEN BLACKS AND JEWS IN AMERICA 171-72 (1988) (contrasting the relatively passive
Jewish reactions in the 1960s when blacks started to enter their neighborhoods with the violence
met by blacks in other neighborhoods).
108. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 133-34.
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were opposed to violence and were inclined to pressure local officials to
prevent it (with varying degrees of success).109
Indeed, one reason common carriers such as railroads and streetcar
companies were often hostile to segregation laws was that their employees
were forced to serve as the primary enforcers of the laws. Not only did such
enforcement cost the company time and money, but it caused many
problems when, for example, train conductors needed to decide whether an
individual with a medium skin tone was a “light skinned negro” or a “dark
skinned white.” Railroads faced lawsuits both for being insufficiently
vigorous in enforcing separate-car laws and for mistakenly assigning whites
to “negro” cars.110 Streetcars, where the costs of enforcement of segregation
were very high, were largely integrated before the law intervened.111
C. Cost Minimization: Raising the Price of Oppressive Policies
White supporters of Jim Crow were committed to maintaining white
supremacy, but for most it was not their only value. Southern whites sought
to maintain segregation in ways that minimized the cost to themselves. This
consideration is related to that of cost externalization but distinct from it.
Cost externalization arises from the desire of some actors to change the
distribution of the costs imposed by the maintenance of segregation. The
concept of cost minimization, on the other hand, stems from Southern
whites’ desire to minimize the total amount of costs.
If the cost of segregation became too high, whites might no longer have
been willing to pay it, or at least might have preferred to reduce the scope
of the system. This idea of a shift in the “supply curve” for segregation has
not been systematically applied to analysis of the impact of judicial review
on policies that discriminate against blacks and other minority groups. The
potential impact is relatively clear: If judicial review eliminates or curtails
the “cheapest” methods of maintaining a system of oppression, it could
erode support for the maintenance of that system, even if judicial review

109. See, e.g., W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 223-24 (1993) (noting that the business and media elite in Atlanta
campaigned against mob violence out of fear for their city’s reputation); LEON F. LITWACK,
TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 158 (1998) (discussing
incentives whites had to prevent violence); MORTON SOSNA, IN SEARCH OF THE SILENT SOUTH
(1977) (discussing “southern liberals” who opposed violence against blacks).
110. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 138-43 (2001);
BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE
RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 356-59 (2001).
111. See Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated
Streetcars, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 893 (1986).
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did not lead to an immediate increase in respect for minority rights. As this
Review shall argue, this concept helps to elucidate Brown’s significance.112
D. Judicial Power and the Rise of External Social Forces Favoring Blacks
Klarman rightly emphasizes the role of broad social forces in
accounting for the increased respect and protection for black civil rights.
His argument and Gerald Rosenberg’s similar claim113 are important
correctives to traditional accounts, which focus almost exclusively on the
role of the judiciary.114 However, Klarman neglects the possibility that
some of the social forces to which he attributes racial progress were in part
dependent upon favorable legal decisions.
In particular, Supreme Court decisions striking down peonage laws and
racial segregation laws played a key role in protecting black mobility.115
This is of vital importance because Klarman correctly emphasizes the
crucial role of mobility in black advancement.116 The Great Migrations of
blacks to the North in the 1910s and during and after World War II enabled
first hundreds of thousands and later millions of blacks to better their
economic prospects and gain access to improved education.117 The ability
of blacks to vote in the North ensured that the growth of the black
population there would eventually translate into greater black political
influence in the nation as a whole, ultimately forcing national politicians to
confront the Jim Crow system in the South.118
Klarman deserves credit for being one of the few legal scholars to
recognize that migration to the North also had a significant immediate
impact on the treatment of blacks who remained in the South. Fear of losing
their black labor force led white planters and businessmen to treat blacks
better and to lobby for laws ameliorating the most egregious practices of
Jim Crow. “Thus, the black exodus induced southern cities and states to
promise, and occasionally deliver, ameliorative policies, such as
antilynching laws, increased educational spending, higher agricultural
wages, and fairer legal treatment.”119 As a 1917 NAACP publication put it,

112. See infra Section IV.C.
113. ROSENBERG, supra note 4.
114. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (rev. and expanded ed. 2004). Kluger’s
book, originally published in 1975, played a key role in establishing the conventional wisdom on
Brown.
115. See infra Sections III.A-B.
116. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02, 163-64, 173-74, 178.
117. Id. at 100-03.
118. Id. at 100-02, 173-78.
119. Id. at 102.
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migration was “the most effective protest against Southern lynching,
lawlessness, and general deviltry.”120
Migration within the South was also significant.121 Increasing black
migration from the countryside to the cities enabled more blacks to gain
better economic and educational opportunities and also to move to areas
where a much higher proportion of blacks was allowed to vote. Even
internal migration within the Southern countryside increasingly enabled
blacks to better their prospects by forcing white employers both to bid
against each other for their services and to ask their political representatives
to provide better public services for blacks.122
Substantial black migration both inside and outside the South would
surely have occurred even in the complete absence of favorable judicial
intervention. But to the extent that peonage laws significantly hindered
rural blacks’ ability to leave their homes and employers,123 and to the extent
that residential segregation laws made it harder for them to move to cities,
Supreme Court intervention eliminating these obstacles played a critical
and underemphasized role in hastening the end of Jim Crow oppression.
E. Causes of Judicial Independence
So far, this Part has focused on ways in which judicial power helped
alleviate the plight of blacks under Jim Crow. However, even if the
judiciary had the ability, we must still ask why it would have had the will.
While we lack the space to consider the full range of possible reasons why
the judiciary’s agenda might diverge from that of public opinion and
political leaders, we do note several possibilities that are especially relevant
to the history of civil rights jurisprudence.124
Klarman himself ascribes significance to the fact that most jurists come
from relatively wealthy and highly educated “elite” backgrounds. On some

120. Editorial, Migration and Help, 13 CRISIS 115 (1917), quoted in KLARMAN, supra note 5,
at 164.
121. By the 1890s, African Americans were migrating within the South at historic levels.
Indeed, “in the 1890s and 1900s every Southern state except Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida
registered rates of black outmigration almost as great as in the famed ‘Great Migration’ of the
World War I years.” EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 151 (1992); id. at 493 n.56.
122. See HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-50, 75-77; see also David E. Bernstein, The Law and
Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1998).
123. For evidence that this was indeed the case, see Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70; supra
Section II.B; and infra Section III.A.
124. In analyzing possible causes of judicial independence, this Review, like Klarman,
focuses primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. However, most points made in this Review also
apply to other Article III courts.
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issues, elite opinion systematically differs from that of non-elites.125
Unfortunately, however, Klarman neglects several other relevant factors,
which are discussed below.
1. Life Tenure and Relative Insulation from Political Pressure
The insulation provided by life tenure is the oldest of arguments for
judicial independence. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued
that it would ensure that the judiciary would function as an “excellent
barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”126
While life tenure certainly does not give judges anything approaching
complete immunity from political pressure,127 it does give them greater
discretionary leeway than is usually enjoyed by elected officials and
temporary political appointees. Relative to the latter, judges are
comparatively immune to punishment by interest groups and others
offended by their decisions.
Moreover, regardless of personal prejudices, federal judges typically
have institutional loyalty to the federal government and are protective of
federal prerogatives. For example, federal judges in the late nineteenth
century, almost none of whom had any personal sympathy for Chinese
immigrants, generally (and in contrast to state courts) protected them from
hostile local legislation by invoking the Fourteenth Amendment and the
United States’s treaty obligations to China.128 Similarly, Ninth Circuit
judges hearing immigration cases in the 1890s shared the prevalent negative
attitude toward the Chinese, but were constrained by their “perception of
their institutional obligations” and when “weighing the evidence in
individual cases” often disregarded “the fact that the litigants were Chinese
or of Chinese descent.”129 Indeed, anti-Chinese forces were sufficiently
disturbed by judicial rulings that they lobbied to curtail federal courts’
jurisdiction to hear immigration cases. 130

125. See KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 450, 452.
126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
127. There is an extensive scholarship outlining ways in which the political branches can
influence judicial decisionmaking. For a helpful critical analysis of some of the literature, see LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138-81 (1998).
128. See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994); David E. Bernstein,
Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999); David E.
Bernstein, Two Asian Laundry Cases, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 95 (1999).
129. LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING
OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW, at xvi (1995).
130. Id. at xvii.
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2. Generational Cohort Effects
An important additional implication of life tenure is the fact that
Justices will often be members of a much earlier generation than the
majority of politicians and voters. Political scientists and sociologists have
for a long time realized that people’s views on controversial political and
ideological issues are often critically dependent on generation-specific
formative experiences. Social scientists refer to these intergenerational
differences in outlook as “cohort effects.”131
Cohort effects lead to large intergenerational differences in attitudes on
a wide range of political issues.132 While social scientists have long
recognized the importance of cohort effects, those effects have not featured
prominently in the debate among legal scholars over the role of the
judiciary in protecting minority rights. Particularly important for our
purposes is the well-documented finding that cohort effects have a huge
impact on the public’s attitudes regarding racial issues.133 Modern public
opinion research finds that later cohorts tend to be more racially tolerant
than earlier ones.134 In the Progressive Era, however, white racism toward
blacks was increasing rather than abating, and the fact that most Supreme
Court Justices belonged to an older cohort probably made them more
tolerant than the median voter and political officeholder.135
3. Selection of Justices from Unrepresentative Subgroups Within the
Population
A variety of political pressures might lead presidents to select all or
most of their Supreme Court appointments from a subset of the population
with unrepresentative views on a given set of issues. For present purposes,
it is significant that Justices will usually be selected from within the
president’s own political party. Presidents sometimes will choose Justices
who not only are members of their party, but who come from a faction
within the party that is likely to best serve the president’s political and
ideological purposes.
In some cases, of course, Justices are deliberately chosen for their
views on specific issues. But it is important to recognize that Justices
chosen for their liberal views on Issue A may also be disproportionately
131. See Norval D. Glenn, Distinguishing Age, Period, and Cohort Effects, in HANDBOOK OF
THE LIFE COURSE 465 (Jeylan T. Mortimer & Michael J. Shanahan eds., 2003).
132. See WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE CHANGING AMERICAN MIND 141-189 (1992).
133. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 196-229 (rev. ed.
1997).
134. Id. at 197-98.
135. See infra Section III.E.
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likely to have liberal views on Issue B, even if B was not a significant
consideration in the president’s decision to appoint the Justice.
Both types of unrepresentative selection bear on Klarman’s thesis. In
the Progressive Era, most of the Justices on the Court had been picked by
Republican presidents and were therefore members of the Republican Party.
Because the Republican Party in that era had little support among white
Southerners, these Republican Justices were all Northerners, and therefore
none of them came from subgroups of the population that had the most
hostile attitudes toward blacks. While not inevitable, it also is not surprising
that these Justices did not look kindly on the expansion of Jim Crow
legislation in the South in the cases that came before them.
Under President Franklin Roosevelt, who made a record nine
appointments to the Court, judicial selection was heavily influenced by
factional and issue-based considerations, as well as by party considerations.
Roosevelt sought to ensure that his appointees would be liberals who would
vote to support broad presidential power; virtually unlimited federal power
over economic regulation; and (to a much lesser degree) freedom of speech
and religion.136 As a result, six of FDR’s nine appointees were Northern
liberal Democrats, the group most likely to share these views.137 While
“there is no clear evidence that FDR nominated jurists with a specific desire
to advance African-American rights, his nominees’ adherence to rightscentered liberalism combined with their devotion to defer to the executive
branch ensured that the NAACP would find fertile ground to lay its
antisegregation precedential seeds.”138 Although helping blacks was not
FDR’s goal, the Justices drawn from the faction of the Democratic Party
likely to support the President’s actual objectives were also—at that time—
more likely to oppose Jim Crow than the average white.
In his book, Klarman recognizes that Brown, decided by a Court still
dominated by the five remaining FDR appointees, was ahead of both public
and political opinion in its willingness to strike down Southern school
segregation.139 Klarman attributes the Justices’ stance to their “elite”
status.140 Yet an important additional element was the manner in which they
136. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 97-143 (2004).
137. Id. Of the three Southerners, James F. Byrnes, Stanley Reed, and Hugo Black, one
(Byrnes) served only briefly, id. at 138, and another (Black) was actually a racial liberal, despite
having once been a member of the Ku Klux Klan, id. at 111-12.
138. Id. at 142.
139. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 343, 450-52. Although, as Klarman notes, about half the
public agreed with the Brown decision from the outset, he also recognizes that Brown came long
before there was any strong political pressure on Congress to attack Jim Crow segregation
directly, and acknowledges that the Court “played a vanguard role in school desegregation.” Id. at
343.
140. Id. at 450-52.
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were chosen. Certainly, a random sample of nine members of the American
elite of 1954 would have been unlikely to unanimously support the
elimination of school desegregation.141
III. RACE AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
The major civil rights decisions of the Progressive Era illustrate the
importance of considerations that Klarman fails to incorporate into his
analytical framework. The Supreme Court turned out to be both more
effective and more willing to take steps to protect some of the rights of
African Americans than his argument would suggest.
A. The Puzzle of the Progressive Era Race Decisions
As noted previously, in the 1910s, at the height of the Progressive Era,
the cause of black civil rights emerged victorious in four sets of cases.142
The Progressive Era cases marked a turning point with regard to Supreme
Court jurisprudence on race. According to one tally, the Supreme Court
heard twenty-eight cases involving African Americans and the Fourteenth
Amendment between 1868 and 1910. Of these, African Americans lost
twenty-two.143 However, between 1920 and 1943, African Americans won
twenty-five of twenty-seven Fourteenth Amendment cases before the
Supreme Court.144
The Progressive Era decisions came in a decade when “racial attitudes
and practices seemed to have reached a post-Civil War nadir.”145 Most
whites, including most white intellectuals, believed that African Americans
were culturally and biologically inferior.146 Progressive political and
intellectual leaders generally shared the racism of the day,147 and

141. Although the Justices differed among themselves on the legal propriety of Brown,
Klarman shows that all but Justice Reed agreed that school segregation was morally
reprehensible. Id. at 294-301.
142. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
143. See BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE
1920, at 13-14 (1946).
144. Id. at 162.
145. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 63.
146. “The literature of sociology was dominated by the view that Negroes were inferior to the
white race in every way. This position of scholars both reflected and reinforced popular beliefs.”
CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 65 (1959) (footnote omitted).
147. See DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE MALIGNANT HERITAGE: YANKEE PROGRESSIVES AND
THE NEGRO QUESTION 1901-1914, at 48-49 (1968) (describing the racist connotations of scholarly
works of the late nineteenth century); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 18771913, at 369-95 (1951) (asserting that both Northern and Southern Progressives shared a racist
outlook).
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Progressive social scientists promoted pseudo-scientific theories of race
differences.148 Moreover, the political branches were overtly hostile to
blacks. Politicians almost unanimously endorsed segregation; those who
disagreed generally kept quiet.149 In 1912, Republican presidential
candidate William Howard Taft and Progressive (and former Republican)
candidate Theodore Roosevelt were so overtly hostile to the interests of
blacks that many leading civil rights activists supported Southern Democrat
Woodrow Wilson.150 The Wilson Administration, however, turned out to be
consistently hostile to African Americans,151 and Congress was only
marginally better.152
As Klarman acknowledges,153 the historical context of the 1910s civil
rights decisions is a problem for those, like him, who argue that “changes in
the social and political context of race relations preceded and accounted for
changes in judicial decision making.”154 The decisions of the Court during
this period may tempt one to conclude that “this apparent disjunction
between cases and context reveals that the justices possess a significant
capacity to defend minority rights from majority oppression.”155 Yet
Klarman resists this conclusion and instead suggests that the Progressive
Era race cases simply “may show that where the law is relatively clear, the
Court tends to follow it, even in an unsupportive context.”156 Klarman adds
that except insofar as they inspired civil rights activists, the Court’s
Progressive Era race decisions “proved inconsequential”:157 Southern
peonage continued for decades; railroads continued to offer blacks unequal

148. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 154-75 (1963)
(discussing racist theories of this era).
149. DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE U.S.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 21 (1995).
150. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 67-68.
151. See Henry Blumenthal, Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 1, 6
(1963) (asserting that the Wilson Administration’s “discrimination against Negroes had all the
earmarks of racial prejudice”); Cleveland M. Green, Prejudices and Empty Promises: Woodrow
Wilson’s Betrayal of the Negro, 1910-1919, 87 CRISIS 380, 387 (1980) (“[F]or blacks, the Wilson
years were a step backward in their struggle for advancement.”); Nancy J. Weiss, The Negro and
the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84 POL. SCI. Q. 61, 61 (1969) (“Woodrow
Wilson’s first administration inaugurated officially-sanctioned segregation in the federal
departments . . . .”).
152. See generally Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the Wilson
Years, 54 WIS. MAG. HIST. 30 (1970) (discussing Congress’s stance towards blacks during the
Wilson years).
153. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62.
154. Id. at 443.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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accommodations; Guinn and Myers enfranchised no blacks; and American
cities became increasingly segregated.158
With respect to the voting rights cases, Klarman makes a strong
argument. While the Court could have constructed a plausible opinion
upholding grandfather clauses,159 the laws in question were a rather blatant
attempt to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment, and legal commentators had
widely predicted that the Court would invalidate them.160 Even President
Taft—like others who believed that the Fifteenth Amendment was
misconceived but must be obeyed—thought that grandfather clauses were
unconstitutional.161 And the practical implications of invalidating
grandfather clauses were minimal, as Southern states had many other means
of restricting the franchise. Indeed, in dicta the Guinn Court explicitly
endorsed literacy tests. According to Klarman, this dictum “ensured that the
ruling had no impact on black disfranchisement.”162
Even if the Court had evinced less tolerance of disfranchisement
mechanisms like literacy tests, in practice disfranchisement was primarily
the responsibility of local officials who could use their bureaucratic
discretion to the detriment of blacks and had every political incentive to do
so.163 Ensuring blacks’ ability to vote in the South would have taken
tremendous litigation resources (which civil rights activists did not have)164
and the sustained support of the executive branch in supporting litigation
efforts and protecting black registrants and voters from violence (which was
not forthcoming).165
Klarman’s argument becomes more dubious when one considers the
peonage and railroad segregation cases, which are discussed in more detail
below in Sections B and C, respectively. The strongest challenge to
Klarman’s position comes from Buchanan v. Warley, discussed in Section
D. Section E discusses why the Supreme Court suddenly became more
sympathetic to civil rights during the Progressive Era.
158. For a similar analysis of the Progressive Era race cases, see Randall Kennedy, Race
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1622 (1986).
159. A detailed explanation of how the Court could have justified a ruling that came out the
other way is found in 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 958-59 (1984).
160. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 70.
161. Id. at 71.
162. Id. at 85.
163. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing Key’s work on
disfranchisement).
164. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 86.
165. Between Plessy and the Truman Administration, the administration most friendly to
black political aspirations was likely the short-lived Harding Administration. Harding sought to
rejuvenate the Republican Party in the South, but unlike other prominent Republicans of his era,
hoped to do so via a biracial coalition, not by turning the Republican Party lily white.
Nevertheless, the Harding years saw only nominal efforts on voting rights. JOHN W. DEAN,
WARREN G. HARDING 124-26 (2004).

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9

BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF

19nn]

Desktop Publishing Example

11/5/2004 3:32 PM

129

B. The Peonage Cases
After emancipation, employers responded to rising African-American
wages by attempting to create voluntary cartels to assure a noncompetitive
labor market.166 When these efforts failed, planters frequently turned to
violence to limit black mobility.167 However, private violence had its limits:
Its use required a certain level of brutality and lawlessness that only some
plantation owners were prepared to exercise; it ran the risk of counter- or
defensive violence; and it was costly, because it usually required payment
to the overseers and underlings who carried out the violence. Not
surprisingly, planters preferred to turn to government to externalize their
costs in suppressing black mobility.168 Moreover, government was needed
to solve the collective action problems created by the fact that individual
planters had an incentive to lure black labor away from other planters by
bidding up wages and working conditions.169
The Fourteenth Amendment outlawed overt legislative discrimination,
so the planters lobbied for facially neutral legislation.170 Among the laws
used to suppress black labor mobility were emigrant agent laws, which
restricted the rights of out-of-state labor recruiters; enticement laws, which
prohibited an employer from “enticing” a worker under contract with
another employer; the criminal surety and convict-lease system, which
allowed the government to lease black workers convicted of petty crimes—
real or trumped up—to planters; and false pretenses laws, which made it a
criminal offense to fail to repay an advance a worker had fraudulently
accepted from his employer.171
False pretenses laws and the criminal surety system frequently left
blacks in a state of peonage. In Clyatt v. United States,172 the Court upheld
the 1867 Peonage Act, which banned involuntary servitude when physical
coercion was used to force a worker to pay off a debt. Six years later, the
case of Bailey v. Alabama came to the Supreme Court.173 The issue in
Bailey was the legality of an Alabama false pretenses law under the
Peonage Act and the Thirteenth Amendment. After similar laws had been
166. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Nation’s Problem, Speech Made upon the TwentySeventh Anniversary of Abolition in the District of Columbia (Apr. 16, 1889), in NEGRO SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1850-1920, at 323 ( Howard Brotz ed., 1966) (reporting that violence
was used against African Americans caught trying to migrate).
168. See Roback, supra note 22.
169. See supra Section II.A.
170. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 9 (2001).
171. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 71-72.
172. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
173. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
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invalidated or construed narrowly several times by federal and state courts,
Alabama enacted a law that created a presumption of fraudulent intent
whenever a worker breached a labor contract after receiving an advance
from his employer.174 Moreover, the laborer was not even permitted to
testify “as to his uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention.”175 The
Supreme Court invalidated the law, holding that it effectively criminalized
ordinary breach of contract.
Bailey marked “the first decision since Strauder v. West Virginia in
1880 in which the Supreme Court took the side of black people in an
important issue of race relations.”176 Nevertheless, and although the Court’s
opinion drew dissents from Justices Holmes and Lurton, Klarman is correct
that one can construe the case as legally and politically “easy.”177 Debt
peonage was commonly understood as a form of involuntary servitude, and
public support for debt peonage was minimal outside of the planter class.
Even Wilson Administration Attorney General James McReynolds, who
later became a Supreme Court Justice notorious for his racism, opposed
peonage.178
Indeed, McReynolds expedited the next black-labor case to reach the
Supreme Court,179 United States v. Reynolds.180 Reynolds tested the legality
of Alabama’s criminal surety laws. Criminal surety laws were not
inherently objectionable, as formally they merely gave a convicted man a
choice between paying a fine, serving jail time (likely on a chain gang as a
leased convict), or working for a planter willing to pay off the fine.
However, the Court chose not to ignore “the patent fraud in a system that
routinely manufactured black criminals” and then entrapped them in a
system in which they were destined to be long-term peons.181
Given general societal revulsion toward peonage, Bailey and Reynolds
do not, by themselves, seem to reflect any great progressiveness on racial
issues by the Supreme Court. Klarman further argues that these cases “seem
to have had little effect on peonage”182 and adds that “experts agree that
southern peonage remained widespread after Bailey and Reynolds.”183 Both
174. 1903 Ala. Acts 345-46.
175. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228 (citing Bailey v. State, 49 So. 886, 886 (1909), rev’d, 219 U.S.
219 (1911)) (explaining that this was an evidentiary rule in Alabama, “which must be regarded as
having the same effect as if read into the statute itself”).
176. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 888. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905), upheld the Peonage Act but reversed the conviction under the Act on a technicality.
177. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75.
178. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 880-81.
179. 9 Id.
180. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
181. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75.
182. Id. at 86.
183. Id. at 88. Klarman points to letters and NAACP files reporting coercive labor practices
in various Southern states, as well as a 1921 report by the United States Attorney General on the
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of these statements are open to question. The fact that some peonage
continued after Bailey does not mean that, as Klarman contends, Bailey
“apparently had no effect on the amount of peonage that existed.”184
Bailey clearly changed the legal regime in various Southern states.
After Bailey, Alabama passed a new false pretenses law that “omitted the
objectionable prima facie clause.”185 Historian Pete Daniel reports that the
incidence of peonage complaints in Alabama “fell off abruptly after the
Bailey case.”186 Meanwhile, pending prosecutions under the invalidated
statute apparently were dropped.187 Arkansas removed its unconstitutional
false pretenses law from the state code in 1921.188 “Mississippi’s Code of
1917 included such a statute, but the Revised Code of 1930 did not.”189 The
North Carolina Supreme Court declared the state’s prima facie clause
unconstitutional, though the legislature did not delete the law from the state
code until 1943.190
Klarman believes that such formal legal changes had no effect “on the
ground,” but events in Florida suggest otherwise. Florida initially dropped
its prima facie evidence clause to comply with Bailey, but then reenacted a
statute with this clause in 1919.191 While this means that Bailey was
ineffective in Florida, it also may contradict Klarman’s view that peonage
laws were superfluous to the coercion of black labor. Laws are sometimes
passed for symbolic or expressive reasons, but the addition of a prima facie
clause to a false pretenses statute probably does not fall within that category
of laws. The prima facie clause could also have been enacted proactively by
the legislature to please planters by showing an interest in their affairs, even
if the planters saw little need for such a law. But the more plausible
explanation for the reemergence of the clause is that planters’ ability to
successfully prosecute workers for failing to pay their debts made a
persistence of peonage in Georgia. Id. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court ignored Bailey and
upheld Georgia’s false pretenses law on the ground that the Georgia statute, unlike the Alabama
statute invalidated in Bailey, allowed the defendant to “make a statement,” though not testify
under oath, before the jury. See Wilson v. State, 75 S.E. 619 (Ga. 1912). The Supreme Court
invalidated Georgia’s law in 1942. See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
184. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 96. Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt point out that
Alabama employers must have thought that pre-Bailey peonage laws were significant, “since it
would otherwise be hard to account for the legislature’s tenacity in amending the statute
repeatedly to get around the state courts’ aversion to criminal liability for breach.” 9 BICKEL &
SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 900.
185. COHEN, supra note 81, at 292-93.
186. PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969, at 145
(1972).
187. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 872.
188. COHEN, supra note 81, at 293.
189. Id. (italics omitted).
190. Id.
191. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 13 (1944) (reviewing the history of the clause and
invalidating the statute).
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significant difference with respect to the planters’ ability to coerce blacks.
In any event, Klarman does not address the issue.
In general, a small risk of incarceration for engaging in illegal peonage
likely deterred some plantation owners from engaging in that practice—
very preliminary investigations, after all, were enough to frighten some
planters into murdering witnesses.192 The somewhat greater risk of criminal
prosecution and eventual exoneration by a jury had its own deterrent effect,
given the uncertainty, legal costs, and shame of a trial.
As Klarman notes, while Bailey upheld federal law banning peonage
for debt, there was no federal law banning involuntary servitude as such.
Nevertheless, one cannot assume that every planter who was willing to
force a black employee convicted of fraud to work off a debt would have
been willing and able to simply enslave his workers. The former scenario
had a far greater air of legitimacy, and, as with all other forms of human
behavior, the level of brutality planters were willing to engage in no doubt
varied from one individual to another.193 While there is no way to precisely
measure such things, the fact that Bailey made it more difficult to
externalize the costs of enforcing coercive labor practices seems to have
accelerated a decline in peonage throughout most of the Deep South.194
In addition to their connection to the collective action problems faced
by planters who sought to cartelize the labor market, the peonage cases
provide support for both the cost externalization and cost minimization
192. See DANIEL, supra note 186, at 133-38 (recounting a case of murder provoked by a
desire to avoid prosecution for peonage); GREGORY A. FREEMAN, LAY THIS BODY DOWN: THE
1921 MURDERS OF ELEVEN PLANTATION SLAVES (1999); KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 88.
193. See, e.g., Cotton Hands That Stay, 82 THE COUNTRY GENTLEMAN 21 (1917)
(describing the labor practices of various Mississippi planters and concluding that while precise
management techniques vary, successful planters are “firm, just, men who take a friendly interest
in the personal welfare of the negro”). [LE: check]
194. One expert concludes that “it would be misleading to imply that little had changed in the
South since 1865, or even since 1911. From the time of Bailey v. Alabama, and probably earlier,
involuntary servitude in the South was in decline.” COHEN, supra note 81, at 292. Cohen points
out that “[i]n the decade 1910-1920, Mississippi lost over 15 percent of its black population.” Id.
at 297. Between 1920 and 1930, South Carolina lost roughly thirty percent of its black population.
And these numbers reflect net out-migration, not total out-migration. As Cohen notes, “Numbers
of that magnitude are simply inconsistent with a picture of the South as a vast jail.” Id. at 297.
Pete Daniel suggests throughout his book on peonage that labor conditions for southern blacks
were as bad in the 1920s as they were twenty years earlier. He notes anecdotal evidence that those
who investigated peonage in rural areas in the 1920s found it to be widespread. “Widespread” is a
subjective and relative term, one that does not lend itself to easy empirical comparison to earlier
periods. Meanwhile, Daniel concedes that one objective measure of peonage—the number of
complaints about the practice—was lower in the 1920s than it had been twenty years earlier.
DANIEL, supra note 186, at 148.
Klarman makes the somewhat mysterious concession that “[b]lack mobility and the
competitive market for agricultural labor limited coercive possibilities.” KLARMAN, supra note 5,
at 88. But the whole point of the coercive practices was to limit labor mobility. If there was a great
deal of labor mobility, it shows that coercive practices, including unlawful peonage post-Bailey,
were not effective.
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theories of judicial impact.195 Obviously, white planters had a strong
interest in externalizing the cost of peonage enforcement to the criminal
justice system, paid for by all taxpayers, rather than by the planters alone.
In addition, public enforcement may have served to minimize the total costs
of maintaining the peonage system by freeing planters from the necessity of
using relatively costlier and riskier enforcement methods, such as private
violence.
C. McCabe v. Atchison
Klarman portrays McCabe’s dictum requiring roughly equal railroad
allocations for blacks and whites, regardless of levels of demand from each
group,196 as a case in which the Court simply followed clear law.197 Yet
compared to the peonage laws at issue in Bailey and Reynolds, the law at
issue in McCabe was less clearly legally problematic. Plessy v. Ferguson
had held that “reasonable” railroad segregation laws were permitted. In the
context of the times, many people would not have thought it unreasonable
for a train company operating under a segregation law to refuse to provide
separate first class cars when market demand for such accommodations did
not justify the supply. Moreover, in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education, the Supreme Court had unanimously upheld the provision of a
public high school for whites but not for blacks, largely on the grounds that
the inequality at issue was reasonable under the circumstances.198 As further
evidence that McCabe’s dicta was not obviously compelled, four Justices
concurred without opinion, likely because they agreed with the substantive
holding (that the plaintiffs lacked standing) but did not want to associate
themselves with the decision’s equalitarian dicta.199
Klarman notes that despite Plessy and Cumming the common
understanding in the legal world was that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, segregation laws had to require equal accommodations for
both races.200 But despite Klarman’s protestations to the contrary,201 it is
hard not to see the McCabe dicta as an important shift in the Court’s views
on the constitutional limits of segregation, especially because the opinion
emphasized that equal protection with regard to racial classification was a

195. See supra Sections II.B-C.
196. 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
197. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62, 77-78.
198. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
199. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 78. Andrew Kull argues, based on a memo from Justice
Hughes to Justice Holmes, that Holmes would have upheld the law on the merits had the Court
reached the issue. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 136-37 (1992).
200. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 77.
201. Id. at 78.
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personal right. Unlike in nonracial contexts, this right apparently could not
be easily overridden by a showing that the classification at issue was a
reasonable one with regard to one’s group, regardless of one’s idiosyncratic
characteristics and claims.202 While the Court was not yet prepared to
challenge the general structure of Jim Crow, McCabe “implied that laws
requiring segregation were constitutionally disfavored,”203 a rather
significant shift given the climate of the times.
On the other hand, McCabe is consistent with Klarman’s theory that
while the Supreme Court will rein in jurisdictions that fail to adhere to
national norms, it is rarely in the forefront of social change. Before
McCabe, most Southern states explicitly required that separate
accommodations be equal; only four states allowed unequal luxury
accommodations.204 The McCabe Court had no intention of challenging the
basic edifices of Jim Crow, and the Court continued to uphold segregation
laws in the 1920s and 1930s.205
Nevertheless, the decision marked a large step forward in the Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence.206 Once the NAACP had the resources and
strategic vision to challenge the unequal provision of public schooling for
blacks, NAACP attorneys relied on McCabe in support of litigation
requiring Southern states to provide equal graduate school education for
blacks.207 Indeed, the Court’s ruling in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,208 requiring that a black student be provided with state-funded
legal education, either through admission to the University of Missouri or
creation of a separate but equal law school for blacks, explicitly relied on
McCabe.209

202. See KULL, supra note 199, at 137-38. See also Andrew Kull, Post-Plessy, Pre-Brown:
“Logical Exactness” in Enforcing Equal Rights, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 155, 164-167 (1999).
203. KULL, supra note 199, at 138.
204. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 78.
205. Id.
206. See WELKE, supra note 110, at 355 (“[T]he Court’s recognition that the right to equality
did not depend on it being economical to provide equal accommodations that were separate laid a
critical foundation for future constitutional challenges by African-Americans.”).
207. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 149-50.
208. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). McReynolds, who was in the minority in McCabe, not surprisingly
dissented in Gaines.
209. Id. at 350-51. Perhaps, given social, political, demographic, and economic changes in
the ensuing years, the school cases would have come out the same way even if the McCabe
majority had not included strong equalitarian dicta, or even if it had ruled that the denial of equal
accommodations was reasonable under the circumstances. But Gaines was decided in 1938, well
before the quantum shift in race relations following World War II that Klarman identifies. This
suggests that the Court’s willingness to uphold the individual rights of blacks was at least partially
a product of legal doctrine. And surely, given its extremely limited resources, the NAACP would
have been less likely to have pursued public education cases to begin with if it had not been aware
of McCabe’s statement that facilities provided to whites under a Jim Crow regime must also be
provided to blacks.
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Klarman asserts that McCabe seems to have “had no effect on railroad
accommodations for southern blacks.”210 The Court said that state law
should not authorize inequality; if railroads nevertheless provided unequal
accommodations, black passengers only had recourse to the common law or
state statutes requiring separate but equal facilities. By the 1910s, blacks,
recognizing that state courts were inhospitable to these suits, had generally
stopped filing them. However, contrary to what Klarman implies,211 there
do seem to have been occasional successful lawsuits.212
McCabe, then, had an only marginal effect on black railroad
passengers. However, it does seem to have had long-term effects on the
legal status of unequal public education.
D. Buchanan v. Warley
1. Buchanan and the Rise and Fall of Housing Segregation Laws
Starting in 1910, many cities in the South, border states, and lower
Midwest, responding to a wave of unwanted African-American inmigration from rural areas,213 passed laws mandating residential segregation
in housing.214 As Klarman notes,215 more cities were ready to follow suit if
210. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 89.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Redmond, 81 So. 115 (Miss. 1919). Redmond was a
victorious lawsuit brought by a black railroad passenger who was denied equal accommodations.
Among other things, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that if a railroad provides white
passengers with separate toilet facilities for men and women, it must do so for black passengers as
well. For another example of a successful lawsuit over unequal conditions, see David S. Bogen,
Precursors of Rosa Parks: Maryland Transportation Cases Between the Civil War and World
War I, 63 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2004) (manuscript at 22-23 & 30 n.102, on file with
authors). [LE: check]
213. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 79.
214. See Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J.S. HIST. 179, 18083 (1968). Klarman reports that Baltimore; several Virginia cities; Winston-Salem, North
Carolina; Greenville, South Carolina; Louisville; and Atlanta all enacted segregation ordinances
in the 1910s. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 79. Other scholars have identified residential segregation
laws passed at this time in Asheville, North Carolina; Ashland, Clifton Forge, Richmond, Norfolk,
Portsmouth, and Roanoke, Virginia; Oklahoma City; St. Louis; Madisonville, Kentucky;
Mooresville, North Carolina; Tulsa; and Port Arthur, Texas. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note
103, at 791; ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF
1921, at 84-85 (2002) (discussing the Tulsa segregation law); MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A
NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 265-66 (1994);
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 41 (1993); Christopher
Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning: Southern Cities from 1910-40, 6 PLAN. PERSP. 189, 192-93
(1991); Charles E. Wynes, The Evolution of Jim Crow Laws in Twentieth Century Virginia, 28
416,
418
(1967);
Posting
of
Steve
Reich,
to
http://www.hPHYLON
net.msu.edu/~south/archives/threads/segregation.html (Feb. 22, 1996) (discussing Port Arthur’s
segregation ordinance). Undoubtedly, other as-yet-unidentified Southern and border-state cities
also enacted residential segregation laws.
215. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90.
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the laws were found to be constitutional.216 But for the intervention of the
Supreme Court, residential segregation by law would likely have become
nearly universal in the South and perhaps have spread to the North as well.
Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance prohibited “any colored
person to move into and occupy as a residence . . . any house upon any
block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied . . . by white
people than are occupied . . . by colored people.”217 The opposite restriction
applied to whites.218 In Buchanan v. Warley in 1917, the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that Louisville’s law was unconstitutional. The Court
reasoned that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by infringing on the right to own and alienate property without
a valid police power rationale.
After the Supreme Court upheld a general (nonracial) zoning ordinance
in 1926,219 another wave of residential segregation laws swept the South.
The NAACP, relying on Buchanan, persuaded the Supreme Court to
invalidate segregation ordinances in New Orleans220 and Richmond.221
Local branches of the NAACP successfully challenged laws passed in
Winston-Salem, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Norfolk, and Dallas.222 By the
1930s, residential segregation laws were rare223 and clearly
unconstitutional.
2. Buchanan as a Civil Rights Decision
Klarman acknowledges that Buchanan “was not constitutional
minimalism.”224 The Supreme Court was certainly not bound by precedent
to invalidate residential segregation laws. The segregation precedent most
216. Charlotte; Charleston; New Orleans; and Meridian, Mississippi are among the cities
known to have considered passing residential segregation laws. Silver, supra note 214, at 193. See
Silver, supra note 214, at 191 (discussing the consideration of a residential segregation law in
Richmond, Virginia, before the Supreme Court ruled that such laws were unconstitutional).
217. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1917).
218. Id. at 71.
219. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
220. Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam).
221. City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (per curiam).
222. See VOSE, supra note 146, at 51-52 (discussing various successful challenges of
segregation ordinances brought by the NAACP).
223. See id. at 52. Despite the general demise of residential segregation ordinances,
Brooksville, Florida passed a law as late as 1948 requiring all black residents to live in the
southern part of town. Dan DeWitt, Racism’s Remnant, ST. PETERSBURG (Fla.) TIMES, Feb. 22,
1998, at 1. The law was not invalidated until 1972. Id. A 1944 Birmingham residential segregation
law was invalidated in 1949. Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949),
aff’d, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950). A state court invalidated a Winston-Salem ordinance in 1940.
See Major Gardner, Note, Race Segregation in Cities, 29 KY. L.J. 213, 213 (1941). Oklahoma
City passed a residential segregation law in 1934, which survived a court challenge because the
complaint was flawed. Jones v. Oklahoma City, 78 F.2d 860, 861 (10th Cir. 1935).
224. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 80.
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obviously relevant to Buchanan, Plessy v. Ferguson, held that segregation
was a valid police power function, and the Plessy opinion was infused with
pseudo-scientific racist assumptions. Moreover, elite legal opinion strongly
supported the constitutionality of residential segregation. Both before and
after Buchanan, law review authors consistently argued that residential
segregation ordinances passed constitutional muster.225
The Court’s opinion in Buchanan, therefore, seems anomalous and
presents something of a mystery. Like many other commentators,226
Klarman argues that the mystery unravels once it is understood that
Buchanan was mostly about property rights, not civil rights. Undoubtedly,
property rights played an important role in the decision, as it allowed the
Court to distinguish Buchanan from Plessy.227 African Americans did not
have a common law right to sit with whites on trains, so the Plessy Court
held that the interest in doing so was a social right unprotected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.228 By contrast, blacks clearly had a Fourteenth
Amendment right to purchase and occupy property.
To this extent, Klarman is correct that Buchanan was a property rights
decision. However, Klarman ignores the most significant aspect of the
Buchanan opinion: the Court’s refusal to concede that laws enforcing
segregation were within the scope of the police power.229 In addition to
relegating railroad seating to the realm of social rights, Plessy had
suggested that any “reasonable” segregation regulations would be proper
exercises of the police power and had applied a rather lax and racisminfused standard of reasonableness. In contrast, after noting that property
rights are subject to the police power, the Buchanan opinion [ME: block
quote] “moves immediately into the antidiscrimination litany that no
Supreme Court majority had [in]voked since Strauder: the Reconstruction
Amendments; the Slaughter-House Cases as the great expositor of the
amendments’ central purpose; Strauder itself, with its famous
antidiscrimination passages quoted at length; Ex parte Virginia; and the

225. Id.
226. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 811-12 (recounting the views of those
who think that Buchanan was purely a property rights decision); KULL, supra note 199, at 139
(“The usual explanation for how it came about that the Supreme Court should vote unanimously
to strike down a segregation ordinance in 1917 . . . is that Buchanan is essentially a decision in
defense of property rights.”).
227. Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 174
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (noting that the Court distinguished
Buchanan from Plessy on the basis of the former’s focus on the right to own and dispose of
property).
228. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
229. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Plessy v. Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 LAW & PHIL. 245,
258 (1997) (“[T]he desire to create a segregated society was patent, and the Court simply refused
to entertain it as a permissible legislative goal.”).
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1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Acts for good measure.”230 The Court
emphasized that “[c]olored persons are citizens of the United States and
have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without
laws discriminating against them solely on account of color.”231
The Court then proceeded to explicitly reject all of the police power
rationales that Kentucky argued supported state-enforced segregation,
including limiting interracial friction, preventing miscegenation, and
preventing the depreciation in the value of property owned by white people
when African Americans became their neighbors. The Buchanan Court
ruled that blacks could not be deprived of their property rights on such
bases.232
The Court’s refusal to defer to Kentucky’s assertion of its police power
is remarkable for several reasons. First, as noted previously, the 1910s
represented the worst period of post-Civil War racism in American history.
Second, the Court had to go out of its way to distinguish Plessy and was not
entirely persuasive in doing so. As Klarman notes, “After Plessy, one could
argue that segregation plainly qualified as . . . a reasonable police-power
objective . . . .”233 Buchanan was “a flat repudiation of the vague and
flaccid Plessy standard of reasonableness as the governing constitutional
sanction for legalized racism.”234 Third, by the 1910s, Progressive
advocates of “sociological jurisprudence” so dominated mainstream legal
thought that Charles Warren remarked that “any court which recognizes
wide and liberal bounds to the State police power is to be deemed in touch
with the temper of the times.”235 Fourth, the Supreme Court had recently

230. KULL, supra note 199, at 139-40; see also 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 799
(stating that the opinion “introduced an abrupt shift of tone and perspective . . . from the entire
corpus of Jim Crow law that had grown out of Plessy v. Ferguson”).
231. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917). Klarman fails to summarize the legal
reasoning in Buchanan, much less directly quote from it. It seems nearly impossible to read the
opinion closely and maintain that the underlying basis of the decision was solely protection of
property rights without consideration of the rights of blacks. The best one can say for the contrary
argument is that some of the Justices who joined the opinion—Holmes and McReynolds are likely
suspects, the former because he drafted an undelivered dissent and the latter because of his
racism—likely did not approve of Justice Day’s emphasis on blacks’ rights.
232. As Bickel and Schmidt argue, “The decision should be read as a recognition, in 1917,
that black people could claim basic rights of personhood and autonomy as those concepts were
then understood.” 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 989.
233. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 24. Indeed, just before the Court decided Buchanan, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that residential segregation laws were constitutional as reasonable
exercises of the police power because they would prevent race friction, disorder, and violence.
Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917).
234. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 814.
235. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (1913). Warren prefaced this remark by noting that “[u]nder
the present prevailing anti-individualism, there can be no doubt that the test of the progressiveness
of a court is the degree of remoteness of the line fixed, within which the legislature shall have
scope to legislate without being held to infringe on the Constitution.” Id.
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expressed sympathy for nonracial zoning, based on Progressive precepts
that could also be applied to racial zoning,236 and Jim Crow racial
segregation itself was part of a broader pattern of state regulation that was
broadly Progressive in nature.237 And, fifth, although Buchanan was
decided during the Lochner era, and the Court no longer simply deferred to
claimed state exercises of the police power, during the 1910s the Court
almost always upheld state regulatory legislation as valid exercises of the
police power.238 In 1917, the year Buchanan was decided, the Court upheld
several controversial regulatory laws.239
Klarman also argues that Buchanan was mostly a victory for property
rights, not civil rights, because “three of the five southern courts that
considered the issue had invalidated residential segregation ordinances.
Though the precise holding varied, these decisions consistently emphasized
owners’ rights to sell property unimpeded by government regulation.”240
The high courts of Georgia,241 Maryland,242 and North Carolina243 did
indeed invalidate racial segregation ordinances. However, by 1917 the
Georgia Supreme Court had reversed itself and upheld a revised residential
segregation law. It distinguished its previous holding by narrowly
236. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
237. WELKE, supra note 110, at 351-52.
238. See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY (2001); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism]; David
E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX L. REV. 1 (2003).
239. Klarman acknowledges that the specific holding of Lochner itself was silently overruled
in 1917 in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), but adds that the Court issued a Lochnerian
decision that same year invalidating a law banning employment agencies in Adams v. Tanner, 244
U.S. 590 (1917). Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. Klarman, however, neglects other deferential
decisions the same year. See Stettler v. O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam) (upholding in a
4-4 vote, with Progressive Justice Brandeis recused, a minimum wage law for women); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (upholding a statute that required that employees
be compensated from a pool into which all employers in an industry had to contribute); N.Y. Cent.
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (unanimously upholding the constitutionality of workers’
compensation laws); Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29 (1917) (upholding a statute eliminating the
fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk). Many of
these decisions split the Court, but one can hardly say that in 1917 the Court was aggressively
limiting the states’ exercise of their police powers.
In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), the Court upheld a federal law limiting the
hours of railroad workers to eight and prohibiting the railroads from reducing pay to make up for
the shorter hours. Justice Day, the author of Buchanan, dissented in Wilson, arguing that the law
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. This
shows that Day was not a strict opponent of Lochnerian jurisprudence. Klarman raises this dissent
to buttress his claim that Buchanan was primarily a property rights decision. However, as
explained above, the facts that Buchanan involved the invocation of property rights and that all
the Justices believed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected property
rights to some degree, did not dictate the outcome of the police power issue.
240. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 81.
241. Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456 (Ga. 1915).
242. State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546 (Md. 1913).
243. State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1914).
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interpreting the holding as invalidating the law in question only because it
applied retroactively.244 The Maryland opinion, meanwhile, was expressly
limited to protecting vested rights. Finally, the North Carolina case, though
broader in its dicta than the other two, held that the law in question violated
the general welfare clause of a city charter, not that it violated the Federal
Constitution. Meanwhile, the Virginia245 and Kentucky246 high courts had
upheld residential segregation laws. By the time Buchanan was decided,
then, no state had ruled that a residential segregation law that did not apply
to vested rights exceeded the states’ police power, and three state courts
explicitly had held that it did not.247
3. Buchanan’s Underrated Impact
As Klarman notes, contemporary civil rights activists hailed Buchanan
as a momentous decision, and some modern commentators have followed
suit.248 Buchanan was the NAACP’s first major victory before the United
States Supreme Court, and Klarman acknowledges that Buchanan likely
was important in energizing the NAACP and inspiring civil rights activism
by encouraging blacks to “believe the racial status quo was malleable.”249
However, Klarman concludes that Buchanan was otherwise
inconsequential. First, he disagrees with those commentators who believe
that the decision inhibited state and local governments from passing more
pervasive and brutal segregation laws, akin to those enacted in South
Africa.250 Second, Klarman asserts that Buchanan “had little or no effect on

244. Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917).
245. Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139 (Va. 1915).
246. Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472 (Ky. 1915), rev’d, Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917).
247. Klarman further contends that the Louisville segregation law was such an obvious
infringement on property rights that “[e]ven the committed majoritarian, Holmes, could not
countenance such a substantial interference with property rights.” KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 82.
Yet Holmes drafted a dissenting opinion, arguing that the white plaintiff (who was barred from
selling his property to a black man) could not assert the rights of blacks disadvantaged by the
statute, and that the law did not infringe on the plaintiff’s property rights in a way that violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 592 illus. (providing a
copy of Holmes’s undelivered dissent in Buchanan). Only eleven days before Buchanan was
released, Holmes was still debating whether to issue his dissent. Id. at 805 n.255. He ultimately
did not, probably not because he changed his mind on the merits but because he could not get a
second vote. Id.
248. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90, 93-94.
249. Id. at 94.
250. Id. at 93; see, e.g., JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 192 (1999) (suggesting that the wave of
residential segregation laws passed in the South in the 1910s “can be seen as a formal step toward
a system of apartheid”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the
United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763,
770 (concluding that if Buchanan had come out the other way, in “many southern states and
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segregated housing patterns, and neither did the two summary affirmances
in the interwar years,”251 and that the invalidation of segregation laws had
little effect on residential patterns.252
With regard to Klarman’s first point, the evidence is inconclusive. On
the one hand, as Klarman points out, Buchanan clearly did not lead to a
rollback of de jure segregation, or even stop its extension “to new areas of
life, such as restaurants, parks, and barbershops, and to new technologies,
such as office elevators, taxicabs, and buses.”253 An underfunded NAACP
could barely keep up with challenges to clearly unconstitutional residential
segregation ordinances that cities continued to enact, much less attempt to
expand Buchanan’s holding.254
On the other hand, Jim Crow in the South never came close to matching
the apartheid system in South Africa, with its stringent restrictions on black
residence and migration. Perhaps, as Klarman implies, political, social, and
economic forces would have prevented such developments regardless of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Buchanan. But perhaps a contrary ruling in
Buchanan would have emboldened racist political interests to launch a
broader legal attack on blacks before such forces coalesced. NAACP
founder Oswald Garrison Villard warned in 1913 that, if upheld, residential
segregation laws would be a first step in a series of broader antiblack
measures.255 Indeed, to get an idea of where things might have gone, one
need only consider that agitation for the complete segregation of blacks and
whites in the rural South was fairly prominent in the 1910s,256 and WinstonSalem seriously considered segregating white- and black-owned businesses
in 1912, shortly after it segregated housing.257

perhaps many other parts of America” the living conditions of black Americans could have been
“almost akin to that of black South Africans” under apartheid).
251. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 159.
252. Id. at 143.
253. Id. at 93.
254. Also, Mark Tushnet suggests that the NAACP, allied with Progressives on many issues,
was not comfortable about pursuing its civil rights agenda through a property rights paradigm.
Mark Tushnet, Laying the Groundwork: From Plessy to Brown 11-12 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
255. See OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, SEGREGATION IN BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON:
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE BALTIMORE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, OCTOBER 20, 1913, at 2, 7 (1913). [LE: bring to
OP]
256. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 791-94; Jeffrey J. Crow, An Apartheid for
the South: Clarence Poe’s Crusade for Rural Segregation, in RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN
SOUTHERN HISTORY 216, 217-18 (Jeffrey J. Crow et al. eds., 1989).
257. Michael E. Daly & John Wertheimer, State v. William Darnell: The Battle over De Jure
Housing Segregation in Progressive Era Winston-Salem, in WARM ASHES: ISSUES IN SOUTHERN
HISTORY AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 255, 271 n.29 (Winfred B. Moore, Jr.
et al. eds., 2003).
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While Buchanan did not change the Court’s acquiescence to the
segregation of public spaces, it made clear that Jim Crow had its legal
limits. W.E.B. Du Bois, in fact, credited Buchanan with “the breaking of
the backbone of segregation.”258 More recently, Judge Leon Higginbotham
argued that “Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake to
decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States.”259
Given the counterfactual nature of the inquiry, one cannot say with any
certainty who has the better of the argument, but one can say that
Klarman’s confidence in his position that Buchanan did not inhibit broader
anti-black measures seems unwarranted.
Another important aspect of Buchanan, one not previously emphasized
by scholars (though related to the apartheid conjecture), is that the Court
clearly enforced blacks’ right to own and alienate property.260 The right to
property not only improved blacks’ economic status, but also gave
property- and business-owning Southern blacks some economic autonomy
from local whites, which allowed them to play leading roles in the civil
rights movement.261 But for Buchanan, it is possible that the property rights
of blacks would ultimately have come under legal threat, at least in the
more reactionary parts of the South.
As for Klarman’s second point that Buchanan had little if any effect on
segregated housing patterns, he is generally correct.262 Indeed, “residential
258. 1 W.E.B. DUBOIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 1890-1919, at
52 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970).
259. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 126 (1996); see also HOWARD, supra note
250, at 193 (“Given the underlying logic of segregation there was no inherent limit to the racial
structuring of social life. The legal premises justifying segregation yielded arguments for the total
racial structuring of society.”).
260. While many blacks remained poor and essentially assetless during the Jim Crow era,
others managed to accumulate sufficient property to give them middle-class status or, far more
rarely, wealth. See, e.g., JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG
BLACK AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS (1991); GLENDA
ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996). [AU: Please give pincite for Gilmore.]
Especially in isolated rural areas, this property was at risk from white violence (“whitecapping”).
See AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880-1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE
AGE OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 106 (1963) (explaining that whitecappers would attack
business establishments owned by African Americans and drive their proprietors out of town);
Holmes, supra note 103. Moreover, the livelihoods of many middle class blacks were constantly
under threat from Progressive labor laws that benefited racist labor unions. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 170, at 44-46, 51-53, 61-65, 69-71, 80 (2001). But blacks’ right to own property was never
seriously threatened by law.
261. See, e.g., David Beito & Linda Royster Beito, ‘The Most Hated, and Best Loved, Negro
in Mississippi’: The Life of T.R.M. Howard (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(discussing the civil rights activism of Dr. Howard, a wealthy African-American physician in
Mississippi). [AU: the title is not on the manuscript. Please provide either title page of
manuscript, or confirmation from authors]
262. Cf. DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948, at 147 (1998) (noting
that Buchanan “by no means entailed the dismantling of racial residential segregation”).

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9

BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF

19nn]

Desktop Publishing Example

11/5/2004 3:32 PM

143

segregation dramatically increased in the 1910s and 1920s” despite
Buchanan, as blacks poured into cities in both the North and South.263 The
significance of Buchanan should not be exaggerated; a decision
invalidating de jure segregation could not, and indeed did not purport to,
overcome private preferences that inevitably led to pervasive housing
segregation throughout urban America.264
However, scholars who argue for Buchanan’s practical significance do
not claim that the decision affected segregation levels.265 Rather, they argue
that Buchanan impeded the efforts of urban whites to prevent blacks from
“colonizing” white neighborhoods, both in the South and the North. The
black urban population in the United States almost doubled between 1910
and 1929,266 and continued to grow in later years. In certain cities, the
growth was far more dramatic; roughly six thousand blacks lived in Detroit
in 1910, compared to approximately one hundred and twenty thousand in
1930.267 In the absence of residential segregation laws, “[a]s the black
population continued to grow in a given city . . . some expansion of the
black-occupied area was inevitable; and attempts to prevent it sooner or
later collapsed.”268 But if Buchanan had permitted racial zoning, many
potential black migrants to cities would literally have had nowhere to go.
They either would have been forced to stay in rural areas or been shunted
off to the undeveloped suburban periphery of cities. Either result would
have been disastrous for black welfare.269 Not only did cities provide more
economic opportunity for blacks, but, as Klarman himself points out, the

263. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 91. In a few Southern cities, such as Charleston, Savannah,
New Orleans, and Little Rock, traditional black and white residential intermingling continued.
Even in those cities, segregation increased, KENNETH L. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE:
BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at 173 (1976), though not to the extent it would have if
Buchanan had upheld residential segregation laws. On the other hand, Michael Daly and John
Wertheimer point out that Winston-Salem’s segregation law, had it survived, would have frozen
housing patterns at a relatively integrated level, ultimately creating all-white and all-black blocks,
but also requiring the continued integration of neighborhoods. Instead, “blacks flowed into East
Winston, and whites flowed out,” eventually leading to Winston-Salem becoming the secondmost segregated city in the United States. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 266.
264. Thomas Schelling explains that even if most whites and most blacks prefer to live in
integrated neighborhoods, if both blacks and whites prefer to live in neighborhoods where their
group is a majority, there will be no integrated neighborhoods. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Sorting
and Mixing: Race and Sex, in MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135 (1978). During the Jim
Crow era, of course, most whites did not want to live in integrated neighborhoods.
265. E.g., James W. Ely Jr., Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 293, 294 (2000) (praising
Buchanan, but stating that “no decision by the Supreme Court could undo the host of legal devices
and informal arrangements that su[s]tained racially separate housing”).
266. Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 MICH. L. REV. 721, 723
(1934).
267. Id. at 724.
268. HIGGS, supra note 82, at 116.
269. See James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections On Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race,
51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 955 (1998).
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migration of blacks to cities, North and South, was a crucial element in the
ultimate victory of the civil rights movement. Among other advantages, it
enabled blacks to increase their political power by moving to areas where
they could vote.270
Klarman never directly addresses the potential effect of residential
segregation ordinances on black migration patterns. However, he asserts
that segregation ordinances were unnecessary to maintain segregated
housing,271 so he likely would also argue that segregation ordinances were
unnecessary to prevent blacks from moving to white neighborhoods.
Indeed, Klarman, citing an article by Booker T. Washington,272 attributes
the proliferation of segregation ordinances not to the demands of white
homeowners seeking to exclude blacks but to “politicians seeking votes.”273
“A single black family’s entrance into a white neighborhood could rivet
public attention and create an irresistible opportunity for ambitious
politicians. Once someone proposed extending segregation to a new sphere
of life, the incentives of politicians were skewed toward jumping on the
bandwagon.”274
One of the authors of this Review has favorably cited Washington’s
claim as at least a partial explanation for residential segregation laws,275 and
political entrepreneurship of the sort that Klarman describes has been
discussed in both theoretical and historical academic literature.276 Yet
further investigation reveals that Washington was wrong; residential
segregation laws were not simply political fluff. Examination of the origins
of segregation laws in Baltimore,277 Louisville,278 St. Louis279 and Winston-

270. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02.
271. Id. at 92.
272. Booker T. Washington, My View of the Segregation Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 23,
1915, at 113.
273. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 92.
274. Id.
275. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 834 n.184.
276. For example, Jennifer Roback shows that politicians successfully promoted mandatory
segregation of streetcars to attract votes from relatively indifferent but politically dominant
whites, despite strong opposition from streetcar companies and African Americans. Jennifer
Roback, The Separation of Race and State, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 63 (1991). Roback
provides a more general and theoretical explanation of the relationship between political
entrepreneurship and de jure racism in Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON.
INQUIRY 661 (1989) (describing the politicization of race by political entrepreneurs).
277. See VILLARD, supra note 255, at 3 (stating that “the chief motive” underlying the
segregation law in Baltimore was the “desire to prevent the depreciation of real estate by sales to
colored people”); W.E.B. Du Bois, Baltimore, in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO
PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-1932, at 23, 23-24 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) (discussing
the demand for a segregation law in Baltimore after successful blacks began “invading” white
neighborhoods); Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation
Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 299 (1983) (tracing the origins of Baltimore’s
segregation law and attributing it to a desire to confine blacks to their existing neighborhoods).
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Salem280 show that they were enacted in response to the demands of white
homeowners and real estate investors who sought to keep blacks out of
white neighborhoods. St. Louis’s residential segregation ordinance not only
originated from the grass roots, but twenty-three of the twenty-eight city
aldermen publicly opposed it.281 Supporters instead turned to a referendum.
The ordinance passed by an overwhelming margin, and “[t]he white wards
closest to Negro residential areas voted most heavily for the ordinance.”282
Of course, showing that white homeowners wanted segregation laws
does not necessarily mean that such laws were needed. Indeed, many
commentators have argued that restrictive covenants were an almost perfect
“private” substitute for residential segregation laws.283 But Klarman
himself, while discussing the effects of Shelley v. Kraemer, aptly sums up
the academic literature on restrictive covenants as concluding that they
generally proved “too clumsy and expensive to frustrate powerful
demographic and economic trends.”284 For example, restrictive covenants
were not self-enforcing, but required someone to pay the expense of
litigation to enforce the covenant, creating a massive collective action
problem.285
As economist William Fischel explains:

278. See George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residential Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky,
1914-1917, 78 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 39 (1980).
279. See Daniel T. Kelleher, St. Louis’ 1916 Residential Segregation Ordinance, 26 BULL.
MO. HIST. SOC’Y 239 (1970). [LE: Bring to OP.]
280. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257.
281. Kelleher, supra note 279, at 242, 245-46.
282. Id. at 246. The ordinance passed by a three-to-one margin. Blacks cast roughly half of
the no votes, which means that among white voters the margin favoring residential segregation
was six to one. Roger N. Baldwin, Negro Segregation by Initiative Election in St. Louis, 14 AM.
CITY 356 (1916).
283. E.g., KLUGER, supra note 114, at 120 (claiming that restrictive covenants made
Buchanan’s ban on residential segregation laws “almost worthless”).
284. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 262. Indeed, contrary to the general impression that
restrictive covenants spread only after the Buchanan decision, Winston-Salem whites, for
example, lobbied for a segregation law precisely because restrictive covenants had proved
ineffective in restricting black settlement. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257. Restrictive
covenants were also well known in St. Louis before white residents starting campaigning for
racial zoning. See Rose, supra note 227, at 181 (noting that the restrictive covenant at issue in
Shelley v. Kraemer had been signed in 1911).
285. Ely, supra note 265, at 294 (“Not only did the enforcement of covenants rest upon
private initiative, but parties had to satisfy highly technical requirements in order to create binding
limits on land use.”); Rose, supra note 227, at 175 (“Unlike zoning, [racially restrictive
covenants] required developers and homeowners themselves to bear the costs of creating and
enforcing legal exclusion; this greater expense undoubtedly discouraged some level of racial
exclusion and opened up a greater total amount of housing to minority members, even if minority
residential areas remained segregated as they expanded.”). To overcome the collective action
problem of enforcing restrictive covenants and externalize the costs to the state, Dallas passed an
ordinance making the violation of a restrictive covenant agreement a crime. A state court of
appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional. City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19
S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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Among prejudiced whites, an all-white neighborhood is a
“public good.” Such a “good” is non-rival and
non-excludable in consumption. Thus if a black family
moves into a neighborhood, the well-being of all
prejudiced whites is reduced, even though they may have
no direct interaction with the newcomer. Indeed, the only
person who has an immediate economic interaction with
the newcomer is the seller who has most likely departed
herself from the neighborhood or, as a landlady, may not
live there herself. While a neighboring white homeowner
might be willing to pay something to blacks to move out of
his neighborhood, his ability to combine his monetary
offering with his neighbors’ is complicated by the free rider
problem of such goods. His white neighbor will think, “If
he is willing to pay let him. We will both benefit, and I
won’t have to pay.” Such reasoning would, in situations in
which no coercive enforcement of collective action is
possible, often defeat attempts to exclude blacks.286
If many blacks had already moved in by the time homeowners or
landlords287 in a “threatened” neighborhood managed to raise funds to
286. William A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 975, 978 (1998). Homeowners lobbying in favor of residential segregation laws also
faced a collective action problem, but a less severe one. First, the problem only needed to be
overcome once, whereas covenants would need to be continuously enforced over time. Second,
politicians will respond to the active lobbying of only a fraction of the relevant population if they
believe that the activists’ views reflect the views of more passive neighbors, while making and
effectively enforcing covenants required far more cooperation among neighbors. Third, while few
white homeowners would have any reason to actively undermine the push for a prospective
residential segregation law, Fischel notes that
[i]t is often in the interest of at least a few whites to sell to blacks. Some
blacks may have a preference for integrated neighborhoods and be willing to
offer more than whites. Or some white homeowners might anticipate that the
neighborhood may be about to be integrated, and they may want to sell
quickly. Excluding all blacks from the market would often mean that
homeowners who are selling get lower offers for what is usually the largest
single asset they own.
Id. at 978-79; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 214, at 37 (“The racially segmented
market generated real estate values in black areas that far exceeded anything in white
neighborhoods, and this simple economic fact created a great potential for profits along the color
line, guaranteeing that some real estate agent would specialize in opening up new areas to black
settlement.”).
287. Like white homeowners, landlords tried to use restrictive covenants and other private
agreements to exclude blacks. Osofsky explains, for example, that white landlords in Harlem had
restrictive covenants on their properties prohibiting them from renting to blacks. However, no
group was able to get the unified support of white property owners to enforce the covenants.
Instead, landlords formed block associations, in which all landlords on a given street agreed not to
rent to blacks. Yet individual landlords consistently shirked on their agreements; white and black
speculators bought tenements and rented them to blacks to try to force neighbors to repurchase
them at higher prices. GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A GHETTO 109 (1966).
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“protect” their property, the “changed circumstances” doctrine rendered the
covenant unenforceable.288 Carol Rose concludes that “[g]iven the patterns
of neighborhood change in major cities, there doubtless were many [racially
restrictive covenants] that simply fell apart for lack of enforcement.”289
In the absence of segregation laws or effective restrictive covenants,
whites often turned to violence to drive out new black residents from white
neighborhoods. Violence had a significant advantage over restrictive
covenants in that only a minority of local whites needed to participate for it
to be a potentially effective tool against black “interlopers.” Yet such
violence was neither omnipresent nor fully effective when used. Unlike
residential segregation laws, which externalized the costs of excluding
blacks to taxpayers, the costs of engaging in violence were internalized by
those who engaged in the violence. These costs could be substantial—
violence not only raised the risk of arrest for the perpetrators, but also led to
the possibility that they would be wounded or killed by blacks acting in
self-defense.290
Restrictive covenants and violence did sometimes succeed in excluding
blacks from white neighborhoods, but they were nowhere near as effective
as residential segregation laws would have been. Despite white opposition,
blacks flooded into formerly white neighborhoods in St. Louis,291 East St.
Louis,292 Chicago,293 and New York.294 Even in the South, where white
“Harlem landlords who adhered to their original restrictive covenants suffered serious economic
consequences. Many were unable to find white people willing to rent their apartments.” Id. at 110.
Existing white tenants remained only when rents were reduced drastically. As Osofsky concludes,
“The opponents of Negro settlement faced the dilemma of maintaining a ‘White Only’ policy and
probably losing everything, or renting to Negroes at higher prices and surviving. Most chose what
seemed to them the lesser of two evils.” Id.
288. See Rose, supra note 227, at 188-89 (discussing the “changed circumstances” doctrine in
the context of restrictive covenants).
289. Id. at 182.
290. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 133-34 (discussing the case of Dr. Ossian Sweet). See
generally HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY (1988) (discussing the history of white racist violence and
recounting black resistance to that violence); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The
Second Amendment: Toward An Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 353-55
(1991) (recounting incidents in which African Americans engaged in armed self-defense during
the Jim Crow era). Many works of history mention incidents of armed self-defense by African
Americans during the Jim Crow era, but no comprehensive treatment of the subject seems to exist.
291. EMMETT J. SCOTT, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR 97 (Arno Press 1969) (1920)
(“Houses here are as a rule old, having been occupied by whites before they were turned over to
negroes.”).
292. Id. at 100.
293. GROSSMAN, supra note 170, at 137 (discussing the expansion of the “black ghetto”
starting in 1917); cf. THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO 117 (1978)
(describing the growth of the black community in Chicago); SCOTT, supra note 291, at 104 (“The
presence of negroes in an exclusively white locality usually brought forth loud protests and
frequently ended in the abandonment of the block by whites.”).
294. OSOFSKY, supra note 287, at 109-10. Buchanan had no direct effect on black migration
to New York or Chicago because, at the time Buchanan was decided, no Northern city had a
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hooligans faced less chance of conviction for engaging in violence against
encroaching blacks, white homeowners in Atlanta295; Indianapolis; Norfolk;
Richmond; New Orleans; Winston-Salem; Dallas; Charleston; and Dade
County, Florida, felt sufficient pressure from expanding black populations
to persuade their local governments to ignore Buchanan and pass residential
segregation laws in the 1920s.296
Klarman writes that “[i]n the Deep South, legal regulation was plainly
unnecessary to maintain residential segregation. Blacks in cities such as
Birmingham, Alabama, knew better than to enter white neighborhoods
uninvited.”297 In fact, Birmingham considered and ultimately adopted a
residential segregation ordinance.298 Even in the Deep South, then,
residential segregation laws were apparently seen as an important means to
restrict black settlement in white neighborhoods.
residential segregation law. However, Klarman may go a bit too far when he states that
segregation ordinances were “never seriously contemplated” in such cities. KLARMAN, supra note
5, at 91. In 1917, the Chicago Real Estate Board—hardly a lightweight interest group—proposed
a law segregating housing by race. PHILPOTT, supra note 293, at 164-65. The segregation proposal
might have received serious consideration if Buchanan had upheld Louisville’s law. Id. at 164;
William M. Tuttle, Jr., Contested Neighborhoods and Racial Violence: Prelude to the Chicago
Riot of 1919, 55 J. NEGRO HIST. 266, 277 (1970). Indeed, even after Buchanan, agitation in
Chicago for such laws continued, especially in the wake of the 1919 race riot. In 1919, for
example, an alderman urged the city council to establish separate “residential zones for white
people and colored people.” PHILPOTT, supra note 293, at 177.
But for Buchanan, it is not inconceivable that Chicago and other Northern cities would
have enacted residential segregation laws. Klarman reports that “[n]orthern opinion was probably
as supportive of residential segregation as was southern,” albeit less inclined, at least initially, to
pursue this goal through legislation. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 143. As late as 1942, “84 percent
of Americans—in the North as well as the South—favored residential segregation.” Id. at 191.
Northern groups with an interest in stifling black migration to cities included white homeowners
seeking to protect their property values, Democrats opposed to an influx of black Republicans,
KUSMER, supra note 263, at 176, exclusionary labor unions fearful of black competition,
HENDERSON H. DONALD, THE NEGRO MIGRATION OF 1916-1918, at 56 (1921) (discussing a 1917
Philadelphia riot incited by labor unions against blacks), social Progressives eager to stifle
interracial violence and limit the threat from blacks perceived as both inferior and potential
economic competitors, MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 182-93 (2003), and the Ku Klux Klan.
295. Atlanta’s City Council enacted residential segregation laws in 1922, 1929, and 1931.
Each of these was challenged on constitutional grounds and invalidated. RONALD H. BAYOR,
RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA 55 (1996). If the only purpose for
segregation laws was to impress white voters, with the laws themselves being essentially
meaningless, the city council would almost certainly not have been this persistent.
296. Silver, supra note 214, at 195-96.
297. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90.
298. Birmingham considered residential segregation ordinances several times between 1900
and 1920, rejecting the idea largely because of constitutional concerns. Carl V. Harris, Reforms in
Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama, 1890-1920, 38 J.S. HIST. 567, 571 n.10
(1972) [LE:Check]. Pressure for segregation ordinances in Birmingham eventually grew
sufficiently intense that, despite Buchanan, in 1925 Birmingham enacted a racial zoning
ordinance “‘to restrict the negroes to certain districts.’” Silver, supra note 214, at 197. The city
enacted one of the South’s last residential segregation ordinances in 1944, and it was invalidated
in 1949. Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949), aff’d, 185 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1950).
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In short, Buchanan v. Warley required white homeowners and landlords
seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods to overcome major
collective action problems and to internalize the costs of exclusion. As a
result, whites were often unsuccessful in excluding blacks.299 As Fischel
concludes,
[I]t was, in the absence of apartheid laws like those at issue
in Buchanan, very difficult to keep the black/white border
from moving in ways adverse to whites. In fact, it must
have been nearly impossible in most situations. We know
this not from econometric studies about who paid what for
housing, but from the simple demographic fact that the
black ghetto took root and expanded in virtually every
large city.300
E. Why the Court Acted as It Did
The mystery of why the Court suddenly became more protective of the
rights of black Americans in the 1910s, despite increased racism in society
as a whole, remains. One theory, propounded by Benno Schmidt, is that
these decisions were “rooted in the institutional revival of the Supreme
Court in the early part of the twentieth century, a revival which made its
impact felt mainly in the aggressive tenets of laissez-faire constitutionalism,
but which produced other, nobler and more lasting, if more tentative,
constitutional legacies as well.”301 Yet one could more easily trace the rise
in the Court’s assertiveness to 1895—one year before Plessy—when the
Court ruled the federal income tax unconstitutional,302 limited the reach of
the Sherman Antitrust Act by holding that manufacturing was not interstate
commerce subject to federal regulation,303 and approved the use of the labor
injunction by federal courts.304

299. Beyond making it possible for blacks to move into white neighborhoods, Buchanan
likely also benefited blacks who stayed in black neighborhoods. In the absence of segregation
laws, self-interested whites who wanted to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods had an
incentive to support more equitable public spending for African-American neighborhoods.
Moreover, segregation laws would have allowed whites to impose the costs of segregation on
blacks, as blacks would have had to pay exorbitant amounts for the restricted supply of housing in
their assigned ghettos. Instead, when neighborhoods began to “turn over,” whites sold to blacks at
bargain prices (though in some cases “blockbusting” realtors, black and white, were the prime
beneficiaries of panic sales). Whites thus absorbed much of the cost of their own racism in the
housing market, and blacks benefited. Bernstein, supra note 106, at 859-60.
300. Fischel, supra note 286, at 979 (footnote omitted).
301. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 990.
302. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
303. United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
304. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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Perhaps, however, the important shift in the early twentieth century was
not the Court’s willingness in general to assert itself, but its newfound
willingness to challenge the states’ assertions of their police powers. As late
as 1888, the Court, over a lone dissent by Justice Field, upheld a
Pennsylvania law that completely banned the sale of margarine, even
though the law was obviously naked protectionist legislation for farmers
with no plausible police power rationale.305 Even commentators who
thought the Court should generally be deferential to state regulation
criticized this decision.306
The Court’s reluctance to challenge state assertions of police power
soon ended. In 1905, a five-vote majority in Lochner v. New York boldly
second-guessed New York’s claimed health rationale for a maximum hours
law for bakers.307 The dissenting opinions acknowledged that the Court was
obligated to second-guess a state’s assertion of its police powers in
appropriate circumstances; the dispute was over who had the burden of
proof, and how difficult it should be to meet that burden.
While the aggressiveness of the Court’s Lochnerian jurisprudence
ebbed and flowed for the next three decades, the Court’s role as the ultimate
guarantor of the fundamental rights of American citizens against the states
in a wide range of contexts is firmly traceable to Lochner.308 Blacks were
hardly the sole beneficiaries of this shift in the Court’s institutional role
(which, contrary to historical myth, was not limited to the realm of
economic legislation).309 Consider that in the 1920s, the Court invalidated a
law inspired by nativist hysteria that banned the teaching of foreign
languages,310 an anti-Catholic law that sought to shut down private
schools,311 and a law that attempted to prevent Japanese parents in Hawaii

305. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
306. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS § 62, at 57 (1904) (“Even the danger to health or safety should not justify the absolute
prohibition of a useful industry or practice [such as the manufacture of oleomargarine].”).
307. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New
York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (reviewing the history of the Lochner case).
308. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 238. The potential for the Court’s
robust self-assertion in Lochner to aid blacks was first shown in 1908 in Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The Berea College Court was faced with a Lochnerian challenge to
a Kentucky law requiring that private universities be integrated, and with Kentucky’s reliance on
Plessy and its broad view of the police power. See David E. Bernstein, Plessy Versus Lochner:
The Berea College Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93 (2000). The Court was not yet ready to invalidate
a segregation law. Rather than simply accede to Kentucky’s arguments, however, the Court
resolved the case on nonconstitutional grounds. In doing so, the Court refused to apply Plessy to a
new set of facts and gave civil rights activists hope that a future decision (like Buchanan)
involving a challenge to coerced segregation in the private sector would be resolved in their favor.
309. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 238, at 48-49.
310. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
311. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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from sending their children to Japanese-language schools.312 All three
opinions were written by the notoriously racist and anti-Semitic Justice
McReynolds,313 a fact that perhaps makes his consistent votes to invalidate
residential segregation laws seem less anomalous.
While the ever-expanding edifice of Jim Crow “ran up against the
fundamental American commitment to individual rights both in terms of
physical and status mobility as a component of liberty and in terms of
freedom of contract as a component of equality,”314 it was not inevitable
that the Court’s increased willingness to challenge state assertions of the
police power would manifest itself in increased protection for blacks. With
American politics and society having grown increasingly racist, one might
have expected the Court to have ignored blacks’ rights, even as it became
generally more aggressive in reviewing state laws.
The Supreme Court, however, is usually somewhat behind the times
relative to changes in both popular and elite opinion on a given subject. Its
members belong to an older cohort than both the median adult and the
median influential intellectual and are likely to have experienced their
formative intellectual influences in a bygone era. In modern times, the
Court’s inherent conservatism has generally cut against its playing a leading
role in recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of minority
groups and women, as society has become increasingly sympathetic to
these groups.
The Court’s inherent conservatism only cuts in favor of courts failing
to protect minority rights from contemporary legislation when popular and
elite opinion has recently become more favorable to minorities. During the
Progressive Era popular and elite opinion were becoming increasingly
hostile to blacks, with the result that the median Supreme Court Justice of
the 1910s may very well have had comparatively liberal opinions regarding
blacks, especially when it came to legal rights and disabilities. Additionally,
the Justices’ relative insulation from popular pressures was apparent in
Buchanan v. Warley. This insulation helps explain the Court’s decision in
the face of racist hysteria aroused in many major cities by the sudden
massive increase in black in-migration.
The Court’s ability to act as a check on the increased de jure racism of
the Progressive Era was enhanced by the enormous turnover on the Court
starting in 1909.315 The generational shift was monumental, from Justices
312. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
313. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 132-35 (new & rev. ed.
1999).
314. WELKE, supra note 110, at 354.
315. The five Justices whose terms ended between 1909 and 1912 were Harlan, Fuller,
Brewer, Peckham, and Moody. Moody only served for four years, and he had replaced Justice
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who grew up in an age when blacks were largely confined to chattel
slavery,316 to those who became attorneys when basic rights for blacks were
written into the Constitution and statutory law. One can speculate that the
new generation of Supreme Court Justices, though hardly radical
egalitarians, may very well have been disturbed by what they saw as the
increasingly aggressive oppression of blacks in the 1910s.317 Similarly,
libertarian and free-labor principles in which the new Justices were
inevitably immersed during the laissez-faire Gilded Age may have
counseled opposition to statist peonage and housing segregation laws that
took away basic rights thought to be guaranteed to all individuals, blacks as
well as whites.318
Moreover, unlike the more subtle Jim Crow laws of earlier decades,
laws disfranchising blacks, relegating them to peonage, consigning them to
unequal accommodations on common carriers, or limiting their ability to
own and alienate property could easily have been seen as an explicit
attempt by Southern legislatures to undermine federal law. The presence of
the first Southern Democrat (Woodrow Wilson) in the White House since
Andrew Johnson—and an overtly racist Southern Democrat at that—may
have particularly inclined Northern Republicans on the Court to exhibit less
deference to Southern sensibilities in McCabe than they had in Plessy. In
the sixteen years prior to Wilson’s election the vast majority of Justices
appointed were Northern Republicans, a group with no stake in supporting
the Southern racism that Wilson represented. It hardly seems coincidental
that five of the six Northern Republicans on the Court (save Holmes) voted
to articulate a stringent standard of formal equality with respect to Southern
Brown, author of Plessy. The new Justices were Lurton, Hughes, Lamar, Van Devanter, and
Pitney. Lurton resigned in 1914 and was replaced by fellow Southerner James McReynolds.
Lamar and Hughes resigned in 1916 and were replaced by Brandeis and Clarke. See JESSE H.
CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543-53 (9th ed. 2001).
316. See MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 215-16 (2004) (noting that all of the
Supreme Court Justices appointed through 1895 were educated or trained before the Civil War).
317. In the absence of direct evidence of why the Justices voted a particular way in a
particular case, a certain amount of informed speculation is inevitable, and Klarman’s own claims
regarding why Court doctrine shifted over time rely quite a bit on speculation. See generally
Garrow, supra note 7, at 699 (reviewing Klarman and noting his reliance on “well-educated
guesswork”).
318. Both of these factors are apparent in Justice Hughes’s opinion in Bailey [ME:
formatting?]:
Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural
operation of the statute here in question, and it is apparent that it furnishes a
convenient instrument for the coercion which the Constitution and the act of
Congress forbid; an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against
the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There is no more important
concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can
enduring prosperity be based.
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911) (citation omitted).
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segregation in McCabe, while all three Southerners on the Court declined to
join the opinion. Like earlier state and local discrimination against the
Chinese,319 the Jim Crow policies that came before the Progressive Era
Court may have raised nationalist hackles. Given that these laws directly
challenged the Fifteenth Amendment (Guinn and Myers), the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Peonage Act (Bailey and Reynolds), the federal
commitment to formal equality (McCabe), and the federal commitment to
blacks’ property and contract rights reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Buchanan), the Justices may have
implicitly sought to defend federal power against recalcitrant states and
localities.320
F. The Impact of the Progressive Era Cases
The fact that constitutional law changed in a favorable direction for
blacks in the 1910s does not answer the question posed by Klarman—
whether “the justices possess a significant capacity to defend minority
rights from majority oppression.”321 The answer depends on what one
means by “significant capacity.”322
The Progressive Era Court was most effective in aiding blacks where its
decisions invalidated laws needed to create a government-enforced cartel
among private-sector actors who had collective action or cost
externalization reasons to defect from voluntary commitments to “do their
part.” Southern planters, for example, preferred to cooperate to stifle black
mobility and wage growth,323 but Bailey’s invalidation of peonage laws
seems to have accelerated a decline in coercive labor practices.324 The result
was an increase in black mobility. This, in turn, created market incentives

319. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
320. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 987 (attributing the outcome of the
Progressive-era race cases in part to a rising sense of nationalism among the Justices, especially
Chief Justice White). See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 50
(1994) (contending that “the competence, perspective, and institutional location and structure of
the federal courts” makes them more likely than state courts to give a generous reading to federal
constitutional rights (emphasis omitted)); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are institutionally more likely to protect federal
constitutional rights from hostile local majoritarian sentiment than are state courts).
321. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62.
322. With regard to the Chinese, for example, the courts were hardly capable or willing to
undermine all anti-Chinese legislation—Congress halted the immigration of Chinese laborers in
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, and did repeal that Act and permit
foreign-born Chinese to become citizens until 1943. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub L. No. 78-199, 57
Stat. 600. Moreover, in the absence of relevant federal legislation, the Court could do nothing
about the widespread discrimination and hostility the Chinese faced from private actors.
323. See sources cited supra note 81.
324. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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among planters to raise blacks’ wages, both in competition with each other
and to discourage black migration to urban areas.325 Buchanan could not
force whites to live in the same neighborhoods as blacks, but it did prevent
cities from stifling black migration by creating de jure and inflexible
boundaries for black neighborhoods, and may have prevented even more
damaging legislation.
Also, the effectiveness of judicial decisions in protecting a minority
group depends on the legal, economic, and political resources the minority
group has to act on those decisions. Blacks in the 1910s had few such
resources. There is obviously an element of fortuity in such matters; if a
philanthropist had provided the NAACP with a huge grant in the late
1910s326 or the racially liberal Harding Administration had lasted two terms
instead of two scandal-plagued years, the Court’s Progressive Era race
decisions would likely have had a greater and more immediate positive
impact.327
IV. BROWN AND BACKLASH
Brown v. Board of Education is arguably the most widely discussed
decision in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Klarman’s
detailed and insightful analysis of the case is an enormous contribution to
an already extensive literature. Because previous reviewers have already
discussed this part of the book in great detail,328 we limit our focus here to
two major points that earlier reviewers, Klarman himself, and the previous
literature on Brown have largely neglected.
Klarman claims that Brown had little or no direct impact on school
segregation, but argues that it had a major indirect impact by stimulating a
huge white backlash—the notorious “massive resistance” to the
implementation of Brown. According to Klarman, this backlash induced a
Northern white counterbacklash that led to the passage of the Civil Rights

325. See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
326. Unlike blacks in the 1910s, the Chinese in the late nineteenth century were well
organized and had well-funded organizations that allowed them to use favorable court decisions to
their significant advantage. See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 128 (detailing various litigation
engaged in by the Chinese).
327. In thinking about what might have been, consider that President Harding stunned a
white audience in Birmingham in October 1921 by announcing that “I would say let the black
man vote when he is fit to vote; prohibit the white man from voting when he is unfit to vote” and
“I would insist upon equal educational opportunity [for whites and blacks].” DEAN, supra note
165, at 125-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. See sources cited supra note 7.
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Act of 1964, the legislation that—unlike judicial intervention—finally
succeeded in desegregating most Southern schools.329
We emphasize two major reservations about Klarman’s thesis. First,
Klarman, like other scholars who minimize Brown’s impact,330 largely
ignores the fact that the mere anticipation of a Brown-like decision led
several Southern states to enact massive increases in funding for black
schools in an attempt to persuade the Court to forgo ordering full
desegregation. Second, Klarman’s backlash thesis raises an important
question that he does not sufficiently address: If Brown was as ineffective
in promoting integration as he claims, why did Southern whites find it
necessary to launch a costly campaign of massive resistance to counter it? It
is possible that massive resistance was simply a result of widespread
ignorance among white Southern voters who—egged on by ambitious
politicians—overestimated the threat posed by Brown to their cherished
institutions.331 But there is also considerable evidence suggesting that
massive resistance was in fact necessary for segregationists to be able to
contain Brown’s impact. If this is true, and Southern racists were properly
afraid of Brown’s effect despite the obvious barriers to implementation
facing the Court, it implies that judicial power can be considerably more
formidable than Klarman and other skeptics suggest.
Klarman not only argues that Brown failed to achieve any substantial
desegregation, but also suggests that massive resistance was not needed to
prevent it from doing so. He contends that “massive resistance almost
certainly proved a mistake” from the perspective of segregationists, and that
329. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 362-64. By 1964, after ten years of judicial action, only one
percent of black schoolchildren in the Deep South attended integrated schools. Id. at 362-63.
330. See sources cited supra note 4 (including Rosenberg’s otherwise very thorough
analysis).
331. The possibility that political ignorance played a key role in stimulating massive
resistance deserves more detailed analysis than we can give it here. Researchers have found that
most citizens have little knowledge and understanding of politics and public policy. See Ilya
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304-13 (2004)
(summarizing the evidence). Public knowledge concerning the judiciary is even lower than that of
other political institutions. See, e.g., id. at 1308 tbl.1 (presenting survey data showing that in 2000
only eleven percent of Americans could identify the post held by William Rehnquist, in contrast
to greater familiarity with other public officials). Several studies of public familiarity with the
Supreme Court conducted during the heyday of the Warren Court in the 1960s show that only a
minority of Americans knew anything about recent Court decisions. See ROSENBERG, supra note
4, at 125-26 (citing studies). Moreover, political knowledge in the South has historically been
lower than in other parts of the country. See, e.g., MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER,
WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 145, 183 (1996) (showing
that Southerners have lower political knowledge than residents of other regions even when
controlling for other variables); Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change:
Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 631-34, tbls. 2-5 (2003)
(showing that Southerners had lower political knowledge levels in surveys conducted in 1952, just
before Brown).
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more modest “tried-and-true evasive techniques” would probably have
better achieved their goals.332 But elsewhere in the book, Klarman argues
that the Supreme Court may have held back on implementing desegregation
for fear of massive resistance.333 Based on this, it could be argued that
massive resistance was a necessary element of segregationist strategy
despite the risks involved.
Either interpretation of Brown’s impact raises serious questions for
Klarman’s broader argument that the federal judiciary had little ability to
protect black civil rights against Jim Crow. If massive resistance was
necessary to prevent Brown from having a major effect, this suggests that
the Supreme Court was far less toothless than Klarman acknowledges. This
point is especially significant given that massive resistance began to break
down even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforced judicial
intervention with federal legislative and executive efforts. As Klarman
shows, massive resistance was too costly to Southern whites to persist
indefinitely, and federal court decisions began to have a substantial impact
on school desegregation once resistance began to collapse in the early
1960s. If, on the other hand, massive resistance was not necessary to
prevent Brown from having an impact, then we must consider why it
nonetheless occurred.
A. Brown’s Neglected Anticipatory Impact
Klarman and other Brown skeptics have almost completely ignored the
striking fact that the case had a major positive impact on the education of
Southern blacks even before it was decided. As Klarman recognizes,
several Southern states, including staunchly segregationist South Carolina
and Mississippi, adopted “crash equalization programs that promised rapid
redress of educational inequalities in black schools.”334 Klarman
acknowledges in passing that these measures were in part “a response . . . to
the threat of desegregation litigation,”335 but fails to consider the
implications of this fact for his broader theory of judicial power. This
evidence conflicts with the revisionist claim that seeking social justice
through litigation is a purely “hollow hope.”336 At the very least, the Brown
litigation was bound to cause a massive increase in spending on the public
schools most blacks attended.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 462.
Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 189.
The title of Gerald Rosenberg’s well-known book. ROSENBERG, supra note 4.

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9

BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF

19nn]

Desktop Publishing Example

11/5/2004 3:32 PM

157

In South Carolina in 1951, Governor James Byrnes persuaded the state
legislature to pass a massive $75 million education spending package which
he said was intended to “provide for the races substantial equality in school
facilities.”337 His school equalization legislation was closely coordinated
with South Carolina’s legal strategy in the ongoing case of Briggs v. Elliott,
the South Carolina school desegregation case that eventually became one of
five desegregation cases consolidated into Brown.338 Moreover, it is
important to note that Byrnes not only promised an increase in spending,
but actually implemented it. Spending on black schools in South Carolina
and some other states “rose greatly between 1950 and 1954,” the period
during which Brown and related cases were making their way to the
Supreme Court.339
An almost equally large school equalization spending program was
adopted by Mississippi.340 Despite many shortcomings, the program did
increase spending on black schools and raise the salaries of black teachers
from thirty-nine percent of white salaries in 1950 to fifty-six percent in
1953-1954.341 Like South Carolina’s program, Mississippi’s was adopted
for the explicit purpose of heading off a federal court decision ordering
desegregation.342 Both programs represented a major departure from earlier
policies.
Although this Review is by no means the only scholarly work to
discuss these events, their implications for debates about Brown and
judicial power have not been appreciated either by Klarman or his
predecessors. The South Carolina and Mississippi programs, as well as
similar though smaller efforts in other states,343 were clearly caused by fear
of federal judicial intervention rather than by autonomous political or social
forces within the affected states themselves. While Byrnes was a relatively
moderate segregationist who “opposed the more blatant forms of white
337. KLUGER, supra note 114, at 334 (quoting Byrnes’s 1951 inaugural address). For further
details of Byrnes’s program, see DAVID ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
OF JAMES F. BYRNES 507-10 (1994).
338. For a detailed description of the links between Byrnes’s legislative agenda and his
litigation strategy, see ROBERTSON, supra note 337, at 507-25. See also KLUGER, supra note 114,
at 334-35 (noting coordination between Byrnes’s education reforms and South Carolina’s strategy
in the Briggs case).
339. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 38 (2001).
340. Charles C. Bolton, Mississippi’s School Equalization Program, 1945-1954: “A Last
Gasp To Try To Maintain a Segregated Educational System,” 66 J.S. HIST. 781 (2000).
341. See Bolton, supra note 340, at 797, 804.
342. Id. at 785-86 (noting that “white Mississippians who began to call for greater
equalization between white and black public schools generally made sure to emphasize that their
ultimate motive remained preserving white privileges and saving school segregation”).
343. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 311; see also Bolton, supra note 340, at 782 (noting that
Southern states “all began or enhanced programs to improve black education” in the years
immediately following World War II).
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repression” of blacks,344 the timing of his school equalization program, its
close coordination with the state’s litigation strategy in Brown, and
Byrnes’s own private explanations of his motives345 make it clear that
staving off federal judicial involvement was his primary objective.
As for Mississippi, the South’s poorest and most vehemently racist
state346 would not have undertaken large expenditures intended to reduce
the massive inequalities between black and white schools on its own
independent initiative. Thus, it is clear that the mere threat of a Brown
decision had a large and beneficial impact on Southern black education as
much as several years before the Supreme Court actually reached its
decision. In this context, Derrick Bell’s well-known argument that the
Brown Court should have given up on desegregation and instead required
state governments to fairly implement Plessy-style “separate but equal”
schooling seems unintentionally ironic.347 It was precisely the threat of
desegregation that at long last made possible even partial realization of the
promise of “equality” under the “separate but equal” standard. Obviously,
the funding equalization programs instituted by several Southern states
could not and did not eliminate the inequality inherent in Jim Crow
segregated education.348 They did, however, mark a significant
improvement over the prior status quo.
There is an even more important implication of the equalization
programs for the debate over Brown’s efficacy. Klarman, Rosenberg, Bell,
and other critics have repeatedly argued that Brown was largely ineffective
in stimulating desegregation. Yet James Byrnes and other segregationist
political leaders clearly were not so sanguine as they contemplated the
prospect of a pro-integration decision by the Supreme Court. Had they
expected such a decision to be ineffective, they would not have tried to
head it off by allocating vast public expenditures for the benefit of blacks,
most of whom still lacked the vote or any other form of political power.
Rather, these politicians probably would have preferred to spend the money
on white constituencies that could help them win reelection. The belief of
Byrnes and other Southern leaders that a Supreme Court decision in favor
of school integration would have significant consequences—and even more
so their willingness to back that belief with large public expenditures that

344. KLUGER, supra note 114, at 334; see PATTERSON, supra note 339, at 38.
345. ROBERTSON, supra note 337, at 507-10.
346. On Mississippi’s extreme poverty and commitment to racism and segregation at this
time, see KEY, supra note 93, at 229-30.
347. BELL, supra note 4. For a similar argument by a leading scholar who nonetheless
supports the holding in Brown, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-50, at 158-62 (1987).
348. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 340, at 793-806 (discussing serious flaws of Mississippi’s
equalization programs).
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otherwise could have been spent on politically powerful white interests
rather than powerless blacks—should give pause to scholars who claim that
the Court had little ability to force Southern states to integrate.
The equalization programs provide further support for the costminimization theory of judicial impact.349 Obviously, equalization was a
much more expensive way to maintain segregation than the previous policy
of simply assigning blacks to grossly inferior schools without making any
effort at all to make them equal to white schools. It is also significant that
white political leaders were willing to pay these costs in order to avoid the
even greater costs (from their point of view) that were likely to be imposed
by a Supreme Court decision mandating integration.
Southern leaders’ expectations of the likely effects of federal court
decisions on desegregation is a critical issue that we can only scratch the
surface of here. Our analysis cannot be considered definitive, but it does
cast serious new doubt on the claim that Brown had little direct impact.
B. Why the Backlash to Brown?
1. The Puzzle of Massive Resistance to an Ineffective Decision
If, nonetheless, we assume that Klarman and other revisionist scholars
are right to claim that Brown could not and did not have a significant effect
on Southern school segregation, we must ask why Southern states mounted
such an immense backlash against it. Why was there massive resistance to
an empty threat?
Klarman argues that massive resistance was fueled by three factors that
“radicalized southern politics” in a way that earlier court decisions had
not:350 [ME: formatting?]
1. Brown was “harder to ignore than earlier changes” because of
extensive press coverage of the decision.351
2. “Brown represented federal interference in southern race relations—
something that white southerners . . . could not tolerate.”352
3. “Brown commanded that racial change take place in a different order
than might otherwise have occurred. . . . White southerners were more

349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra Sections II.B-C.
KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 391.
Id.
Id.
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intensely committed to preserving school segregation, which lay near the
top of the white supremacist hierarchy of preferences.”353
These three explanations are significant, but they cannot explain the
massive scale of Southern backlash if we assume that Brown was not likely
to have any real impact on Southern school segregation.
With regard to press coverage, it is not clear why extensive press
coverage of Brown would necessarily lead to a massive backlash against a
decision that was not having any significant effect. Indeed, one might
expect that extensive press coverage would actually calm white fears as
news of the decision’s ineffectiveness spread more quickly than it might
have otherwise. Furthermore, Klarman presents little evidence to support
his claim that Brown received massive press coverage,354 and neglects
extensive data assembled by Gerald Rosenberg indicating that mid-1950s
press attention to Brown and other civil rights issues was comparatively
modest.355
Klarman is certainly right to claim that Brown represented an effort at
federal interference in Southern race relations. But the same could be said
of virtually every other pro-civil rights decision issued by the federal courts.
Yet only Brown stimulated such enormous resistance, a puzzling result if
the decision was toothless.
Klarman is also right to note that Southern whites were particularly
sensitive on the issue of school integration. Even so, it is difficult to
understand why they would generate such an enormous backlash against a
decision that was not actually causing any integration to occur. At the very
least, one would have expected the uproar to have quickly died down as
Brown’s ineffectiveness became more evident to Southern whites. In
reality, as Klarman documents, the scale and vehemence of massive
resistance actually increased during the first several years following
Brown.356
In sum, Klarman fails to resolve the tension between the claim that
Brown was not (and could not have been) effective in promoting school
integration, and the undeniable fact that it generated a massive and
unprecedented white political backlash. Klarman concludes that massive
353. Id.
354. The evidence cited consists of the assertion that Brown “received front-page coverage in
virtually every newspaper in the country” and quotes from two sources—a Northern visitor to the
South and a segregationist political activist.[LE: check] Id. It is surely true that Brown made the
front page, but that is very different than saying that it led to a lasting increase in press attention to
civil rights matters.
355. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 111-16 (citing extensive evidence and numerous
studies indicating limited press attention to civil rights matters in the years immediately following
Brown).
356. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 393-400.
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resistance was probably an irrational strategy because it “abandoned the
tried-and-true evasive techniques that for decades had successfully nullified
the constitutional rights of blacks, in favor of outright defiance.”357
Segregationist strategists would have been more successful in escaping the
wrath of Northern whites if they had “eschewed” the use of violence and
“vigilante mobs” to block “desegregation orders” and instead used
inconspicuous “fraudulent mechanisms to circumvent school
desegregation.”358 Yet it strains credulity to believe that the vast majority of
political leaders and activists across most of the white South were simply
irrational or bullheaded. A more plausible alternative explanation for
massive resistance is that Brown was not as toothless as Klarman suggests.
Massive resistance may in fact have been the only available means to
neutralize Brown’s impact, albeit at the cost of eventually provoking even
greater federal intervention.
3. Was Massive Resistance Needed To Prevent Brown from Having a
Greater Impact?

A. Evidence That Massive Resistance Was Necessary To Block Brown
There are several pieces of evidence suggesting that only massive
resistance was capable of severely constricting Brown’s immediate impact.
While none are definitive in and of themselves, their cumulative impact
seriously undermines the argument that less radical forms of resistance
would have more effectively maintained segregation. First, Klarman’s
excellent account of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking implies that
massive-resistance advocates were right to believe that drastic threats of
violence and school closures played a decisive role in blocking
implementation of Brown. In their deliberations over Brown II,359 the key
case determining guidelines for implementing the original Brown decision,
Klarman demonstrates that the Justices decided to adopt the notoriously
gradualist “all deliberate speed” formula in large part out of fear of
violence.360 [LE: check] As Klarman points out, this decision broke with
prior practice in civil rights cases—including cases desegregating higher
education—where the rule had been that constitutional rights must be

357. Id. at 462.
358. Id. Klarman uses North Carolina as an example of such subtle resistance to Brown, one
that could have been a model for other states. Id.
359. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
360. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 314-16.
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implemented immediately.361 While we cannot know for certain that the
Court would have insisted on swifter implementation in the absence of
threats of violence and school closures, such a step would have been
consistent with prior practice and with the Justices’ belief that segregation
in education was morally abhorrent.362 At the very least, the fact that
massive resistance played a major role in the Justices’ calculations suggests
that they might have acted differently in its absence.
A second source of evidence indicating that massive resistance may
have been necessary to stymie the enforcement of Brown was the
experience of the border states, where state governments did not engage in
major resistance to Brown. As a result, Brown greatly reduced school
segregation in these states long before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even
Rosenberg, the most thoroughgoing of academic Brown skeptics, concedes
that “[t]he Supreme Court appears to have had an important impact on
school desegregation in the six border states and the District of
Columbia.”363 Klarman too, acknowledges that Brown was successful in
desegregating the border states, though he also notes—correctly—that
significant pockets of segregation remained.364
Rosenberg concludes that Brown was effective in the border states
because “there was little in the way of large-scale, hard-core
opposition”365—precisely the kind of opposition that, further south, was
supplied by the forces of massive resistance. From a cost-minimization
standpoint, border-state whites, because of their lesser commitment to Jim
Crow, were more price sensitive than those in the Deep South. When the
price of maintaining school segregation was raised by Brown, border-state
whites were unwilling to pay it by adopting a strategy of massive
resistance.
A third piece of evidence is drawn from Klarman’s account of the
demise of massive resistance in the Deep South in the early 1960s.366
Massive resistance collapsed because Southern whites began to find
constant violence and school closings too great a price to bear.367 White

361. Id. at 314.
362. See id. at 292-312.
363. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 50. While only about one percent of Southern black
schoolchildren were attending integrated schools as late as 1964, in the border states almost fiftyfive percent were doing so. Id.
364. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 346-48.
365. Id. at 104.
366. Id. at 417-20.
367. Id. White Southern leaders themselves noted that massive resistance had collapsed
because its cost was too great. As segregationist Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond put it in
1962, “[T]he only way to defeat integration was to close down every single, solitary school in this
state, and keep them closed.” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE
BYRD MACHINE AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 126 (1976).
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business leaders in particular began to oppose massive resistance because
they “dreaded the economic impact of closed schools.”368 As a result, they
were forced to switch to less aggressive tactics, such as admitting “token”
numbers of black students while trying to use administrative machinery to
keep out the rest.369 The collapse of massive resistance led to a substantial
increase in the pace of desegregation in 1962-1963, prior to the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.370 In the fall of 1963, 161 school districts
desegregated, “by far the largest number since 1956.”371 We cannot know
how fast desegregation would have proceeded had the Civil Rights Act not
been adopted and the judiciary been forced to continue to battle school
segregation largely on its own. However, as Klarman notes, it is clear that
the collapse of massive resistance “had increased the pace of
desegregation.”372
B. Why Evasion Might Not Have Been Enough
If massive resistance was needed to stop Brown from having a major
impact, this raises the question of why the subtle evasion tactics that
Klarman suggests Southern states might have adopted instead were not
sufficient. Obviously, we cannot know for sure what would have happened
had Southern state governments abjured massive resistance from the very
beginning and instead concentrated on more moderate tactics of evasion.
Although historians are more receptive to counterfactuals than they have
been in the past,373 counterfactual analysis remains an inexact science at
best. Nonetheless, we tentatively suggest two reasons that subtle evasive
tactics would not have been effective: greater transparency of school policy
as compared to some other aspects of Jim Crow and a lower judicial
tolerance for subterfuge caused by the changing composition of the federal
judiciary.
Unlike in the areas of criminal procedure and voting registration, where
subtle evasion had been highly effective, discrimination in school
enrollment was comparatively more transparent. In criminal procedure, for
example, courts could relatively easily detect and reverse flagrant cases
where defendants were almost literally railroaded to conviction, but could
not readily ferret out more subtle forms of discrimination against black

368. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE NEW SOUTH, 1945-1980, at 245 (1995).
369. Id. at 417-19.
370. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 361-63.
371. Id. at 362.
372. Id. at 363.
373. See, e.g., VIRTUAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS (Niall Ferguson
ed., 1997) (presenting analysis of a range of counterfactual scenarios by leading historians).
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defendants and potential jurors.374 Similarly, in a context where Supreme
Court decisions affirmed the legality of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other
facially race-neutral methods of excluding voters, it was very difficult for
courts to tell whether local registrars—who generally had broad
discretionary authority—were implementing these policies in a
discriminatory way in any given case.375 By contrast, the ongoing exclusion
of all or nearly all black schoolchildren from white schools located in close
geographic proximity to them could not easily be hidden or explained away
in the face of even mildly skeptical judicial scrutiny.376
Despite the relative transparency of school segregation, there were
probably enough subterfuges available to Southern authorities that federal
lower courts could have found grounds for ignoring persistent segregation
had they been strongly inclined to do so. A vital element of the
desegregation story was therefore the refusal of numerous lower court
judges to accept excuses and subterfuges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which at that time covered most of the Deep South,
invalidated a wide range of efforts to get around desegregation
requirements and eventually imposed detailed integration requirements on
recalcitrant school officials.377
A key factor in the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to endorse Southern state
governments’ efforts at obstructionism as much as its predecessors had
done was the court’s composition. Five of the circuit’s judges were

374. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 274-83.
375. See KEY, supra note 93, at 560-76 (showing how discriminatory exclusion of black
voters was usually accomplished by the exercise of discretionary authority at the local level).
376. Obviously, a much different situation arose in later cases, where school segregation
existed as a consequence of housing segregation rather than as a result of discriminatory
assignment of students to segregated schools far from their homes. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR,
FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995) (describing and criticizing
judicial decisions using forced busing of students as a remedy for school segregation caused by
housing segregation). In the Jim Crow-era South of the 1950s and 1960s, however, the main focus
of reform efforts was on the more blatant discrimination embodied in state efforts to force black
students to attend more distant segregated schools even in situations where white schools were
located nearby.
377. The best known of the Fifth Circuit decisions striking down subterfuges was United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per
curiam), which struck down a “freedom of choice” plan and imposed detailed integration
guidelines on school officials. But the Fifth Circuit had cracked down on various subterfuges well
before then. Between 1955 and 1960, federal judges in the South held over 200 hearings on the
subject of school desegregation, most of them involving state efforts to impede school integration.
PATTERSON, supra note 339, at 96. [LE: check] For detailed accounts of the Fifth Circuit’s role,
see HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981 (1984); J.W. PELTASON,
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961);
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 90-91, 111-14 (1979); Jack Bass, The Fifth Circuit in Southern
History, 19 GA. L. REV. 473 (1985).
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appointed by President Eisenhower in the 1950s.378 Three of the five
Eisenhower nominees—John Minor Wisdom, Elbert Tuttle, and John
Brown—“became prominent supporters of desegregation” on the bench.379
Wisdom in particular became highly influential as the leader of
desegregation efforts in the lower courts.380
The emergence of Eisenhower appointees as champions of
desegregation was not accidental. Although Eisenhower himself was at best
lukewarm with respect to Brown,381 his Justice Department was staffed by
Republicans from the “Party’s eastern liberal wing” supportive of
desegregation.382 In choosing judicial nominees for Southern federal courts,
they sought to pick integrationists and, at the very least, exclude strong
supporters of segregation.383 Perhaps even more importantly, Eisenhower’s
main goal in selecting judges was to ensure the selection of as many
Republicans as possible in order to rectify the “acute political imbalance” in
the federal judiciary brought about by twenty years of Democratic control
of the nomination process.384 In the Democrat-dominated South of the
1950s, the Republican Party had for a long time been more receptive to
desegregration than had the Democrats. Thus, the policy of appointing
Republican judges led to the creation of a federal judiciary more
sympathetic to integration and less willing to permit evasions of Brown
than would otherwise have been the case. This is a striking example of how
political imperatives unrelated to race might nonetheless lead to the
selection of judges who disproportionately come from groups relatively
sympathetic to civil rights enforcement.385 While not all of Eisenhower’s
Southern judicial appointees supported desegregation,386 the combination of
the President’s partisan objectives and his Justice Department’s

378. Data calculated from Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 129 (1997). Eisenhower also appointed three judges to
the Fourth Circuit, which included much of the Upper South. [LE: cite]
379. GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 129.
380. For a recent account of Wisdom’s impact, see Joel Wm. Friedman, The Emergence of
John Minor Wisdom as Intellectual Leader of the Fifth Circuit: Reflecting Back on the Forty-Fifth
Anniversary of His Joining the Court, 77 TUL. L. REV. 915 (2003).
381. Eisenhower privately stated, “I personally think the decision was wrong.” ARTHUR
LARSON, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT NOBODY KNEW 124 (1968) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Publicly, he expressed support for judicial enforcement of the decision, without publicly
commenting on whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning was correct or not. GOLDMAN, supra note
378, at 127.
382. GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 127.
383. Id. at 127-30.
384. Id. at 112, 112-13. [LE: check]
385. See supra Subsection II.E.3.
386. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 129 (noting that one of Eisenhower’s appointees
to the Fifth Circuit was an “ultra segregationist”).
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integrationist sympathies ensured that the new judges were, on average,
much more liberal on racial issues than those they replaced.387
C. Cost Minimization and Brown’s Impact
Although Brown failed to achieve immediate desegregation in the
South of the kind that was accomplished in the border states, it did greatly
increase the cost of maintaining school segregation. By the early 1960s,
most Southern whites were no longer willing to go on paying it.388 The cost
minimization hypothesis is thus supported by the evidence: Brown
promoted school desegregation by greatly increasing the costs of preventing
it. While the Court certainly was not the omnipotent force for good of
traditional Brown hagiography, Klarman’s own meticulous research
suggests that he understates its effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is an outstanding contribution to the
literature on both civil rights law and judicial power more generally. The
book should be, and likely will be, at the forefront of debate over these
topics for the foreseeable future. Future research on the Supreme Court’s
role in American society should emulate Klarman’s emphasis on the
importance of social context for constitutional law and supplement it with
equally rigorous attention to collective action problems, cost
externalization, cost minimization, and other factors that can augment the
impact of judicial decisions invalidating laws. As Klarman persuasively
demonstrates, judicial power is no panacea for the troubles of the
oppressed. Judges lack the capacity to comprehensively uproot and reform
entrenched social systems. But there is also much evidence, some of it
provided by Klarman himself, that judicial power can do more for
oppressed minorities than today’s skeptics are willing to admit.

387. For evidence of the major changes wrought by Eisenhower’s lower court appointees, see
sources cited supra note 377.
388. See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text.
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